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This short treatise on one aspect of Confederate 
diplomacy is the result of a pleasant synthesis of 
interests in United States history. The author's 
personal interest in American foreign relations and his 
recent involvement in Civil War studies contributed to 
the selection of the thesis topic. 
The paper is the extension of research originally 
initiated under the supervision of Professor w. Harrison 
Daniel, to whom the author wishes to extend appreciation 
for a current and developing interest in Civil War 
history. 
The author expresses deep appreciation to 
Assistant Frofessor Ernest c. Bolt, Jr., who not only 
has carefully directed the completion of this thesis 
but who has increased the author's awareness and 
interest in matters of American Diplomatic History. 
Finally, the author commends the patience and 
assistance of his wife, Carolyn, whose understanding 
attitude consistently eased the burdens of graduate 
study. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the secession movement of January-
February, 1861, which culminated in the Montgomery 
Constitutional Convention, the young Confederate 
government established well-defined policy objectives 
for the purpose of securing European allies and material 
assistance. Basically these aims were three-fold: to 
secure recognition of the sovereign status of the 
Confederate otates; to induce intervention by the 
European powers on the side of the Confederacy; and, 
after April, 1861, to gain a repudiation of the Union 
blockade from these same powers. Relying predominantly 
on the coercive power of cotton, the South began its 
quest for these objectives with diplomatic efforts di-
rected at the leading European commercial nations. 
Great Britain immediately became the focal 
point of the diplomatic ventures. Since Britain stood 
to be the most affected by any severe interruption of 
the cotton supply, the Confederates decided that all 
possible pressures should be put on her to sharpen her 
awareness of this fact ana to lure her to economic 
security through alliance with the cotton capital of 
the world, the Confederate States. 
Despite the clear definition of Confederate 
foreign policy aims, the initial Southern mission to 
Britain and the Continent revealed the great disparity 
between diplomatic theory and diplomatic performance. 
The activities of William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre A. 
Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann, the first Southern 
envoys to Europe, were constantly suppressed by the 
inadequate formation and execution of their diplomatic 
instructions. 
2 
It ie on ·this matter of Southern policy formation 
and implementation that the author assumes disagreement 
with the heretofore definitive work on Confederate 
foreign relations, Frank L. Owsley's King Ootton Diplomacy. 
Professor Owsley has written a massive and scholarly 
contribution to the history of Southern diplomacy. 
Yet, through his total reliance on the theme of cotton, 
he has ignored or discarded as irrelevant those factors 
which would challenge the unanimity of Southern support 
behind the ''cotton famine" policy of Jefferson Davia. 
As a result, Owsley has entered an explanation for the 
failure of cotton diplomacy based on the ineptitude of 
the Gonf ederate envoys and the pressures of external 
conditions rather than on the basic policy itself. 
3 
Through the benefit of subsequent scholarship 
and the convenient acquisition of primary materials, the 
author intends to present a more thorough and objective 
analysis of the Yancey-Rost-Mann mission. Although, as 
Owsley and others admit, external factors arose to frus-
trate the Southern overtures, more often than not, the 
grounds for the failure rested with the Confederates 
themselves. As the author proposes to demonstrate, the 
failures of the first Southern mission to ~'urope origi-
nated not with the commissioners, or Union counter-
diplomacy, or even in European neutrality, but with the 
inadequate, restrictive policy upon which the Confederate 
representatives relied. 
During the commission's European appointment, 
March, 1861. to January, 1862, many of the principal 
domestic and foreign crises of the Civil War took place. 
From the capture of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's declara-
tion of a state of internal insurrection to the institu-
tion of the Northern blockade, First Manassas, and the 
Trent affair, the ministers gauged the climate of' 
European opinion in expectation of some favorable commit-
ment to the Confederate cause. Though personally opti-
mistic in the power of cotton and confident in the 
righteousness of the ~outhern action, the commissioners 
operated in a predominantly hostile atmosphere where 
their apparent allies were the political opportunists 
and economic speculators of England and France. 
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This paper, then, attempts to investigate ana 
evaluate Confederate foreign policy through the Yancey-
Rost-M.ann mission to Great Britain. The approach is 
largely chronological, although there is some topical 
presentation. The basic intent of the study is to 
examine the f ounaation ana formation of Southern foreign 
policy, the actual operation and strategy of the Yanoey-
Host-Mann mission, and finally, the failures and 
inadequacies of the policy both in execution and in 
theory. 
CHAPTER I 
THE CHAL~NGE OF KING COTTON 
In the very first line of his standard monograph 
on the foreign relations of the Confederate States of 
America, King Cotton Diplomacy, Profe~sor Frank L. Owsley 
states unequivocally that cotton was the foundation of 
the Confederacy. 1 No truer yet more obvious summation 
has been made of the basis of Southern social and eco-
nomic life, and eventually, of Confederate diplomacy. 
Yet Owsley, through his unfailing devotion to the theme 
of cotton, would have us believe that there not only 
was complete unanimity within the ~outh in regard to 
the power of cotton but also total accord concerning 
the specific use of cotton to achieve the Confederate 
diplomatic aims. 
By 1861, a universal Bouthern confidence and 
1Frank L. Owsley, K!.ng Cotton Diplomacy (Revised edition, 
Chicago: 1959), 1. Although the author is in disagree-
ment with Owsley concerning the formation of Confederate 
foreign policy, he does not intend this paper to be merely 
a refutation of some aspects of King Cotton Diplomacy. 
In questioning the conclusiveness and reliability of some 
of Owsley's explanations, the author only intends to 
demonstrate that there iu room for much clarification in 
certain areas of Confederate diplomacy. 
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awareness in the power of cotton definitely existed. What 
did not exist was complete harmony among Southern leaders 
over the actual employment of cotton as an international 
allurement. Through his conspicuous omission of evidence 
concerning the formation of Confederate foreign policy, 
Owsley would have us falsely accept the existence among 
the ~outhern policymakers of a total concordance in 
regards to both diplomatic tactics and objectives. It 
is the formation of policy, rather than the basis for 
the policy, which deserves reconsiaeration. Before 
taking up the matter of actual policy formation, however, 
it is necessary to understand the policy basis -- cotton. 
On March 4, 1858, amidst the feverish debates 
and bitter quarrels in the United States Senate over 
the Kansas situation and especially over the Lecompton 
Constitution and its validity, Senator M. B. Hammond of 
South Carolina challenged the North and the world to ad-
here to the power of Southern cotton. In ringing tones 
he accented the strength of Southern cotton and its 
controlling influence in world economic circles. He 
concluded by asserting that cotton was too formidable a 
foe for the North, or anyone. "Cotton is king," spoke 
Hammond, and "no power on earth dares to make war 
7 
upon it."2 
The origins of this philosophy, so passionately 
and confidently spoken by Hammond and echoed throughout 
the entire South by 1861, go back several decades to the 
development of slave-state cotton as the primary substance 
for the looms of the United States, Great Britain and 
the Continent. Thie was principally achieved thro1J8h 
the occurrence of two events at opposite ends of the 
globe in the first half of the eighteenth century. In 
America, the invention and development of the cotton gin 
resulted in the production and refinement of a brand of 
co1;ton far superior and cheaper than any previously 
used.3 In India, English investigations in the early 
1840's revealed that the Indian soil could not grow the 
type of outstanding cotton which flourished in the rich 
southern soils of America.4 Thus, by 1845, there was al• 
most a complete transfer of the British and Continental 
cotton industries from the use of Indian and Egyptian 
2~enator M. B. Hammond, "Speech on the Admission of 
Kansas," March 4, 1858, United States Benate• Co8'ressional 
Globe, 35th Congress (31 vols., Washington: 1858 , 
XXXVI, 961. 
)Although Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793, 
refinements brought more efficiency by 1861. The employ-
ment of slave labor for agricultural rather than industrial 
purposes in the South was the natural result of the cotton 
gin's improvements and potentialities. 
40weley, ~Cotton, 5. 
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cotton to American, or more specifically, southern cotton. 
The result was near total reliance of the European cotton 
inteTests on the supply of American cotton. 
It was in Great Britain, though, wheI"e the nation's 
largest industry depended so completely on a foreign 
market, that the enormous and serious problems caused by 
such an adverse economic situation were most clearly 
demonstrated. By 1860, "about one-fifth of the population 
of England" -- or as the London Economist estimated, 
"nearly four than th..r.ee milllons"5 -- depended, directly 
or indirectly, upon the cotton industry for its liveli-
hood. 6 Almost eighty per cent of the staple that main-
tained this huge activity came from the South.7 
Thia economic situation created great consterna-
tion among many British politicians and economists who 
anticipated a national calamity in the event of disruption 
or loss of the American cotton crop. In 1853, the London 
Economist warned that "any great social or physical con-
vulsion" in the United States would adversely affect all 
of ~ngland. The Economist cautioned that any distress in 
5London Economist, January 19, 1861, in Owsley; ~ 
Cotton, 8-9. 
6Thomas A. Bailey, A Di?lomatic Hiator~ of the American 
People, {7th edition, Hew ork: 1964), 33 .-- ---
7~., 333. 
America would force the idleness of hundreds of ships, 
the closure of thousands of mills, and the starvation of 
millions of people. 8 ''The destiny of the world hangs on 
a thread," exclaimed the London Times; "never did so 
much depend on a mere flock of down.n9 
And so it seemed. To the British economic and 
political alarmists, perhaps unaware of the enormous 
cotton surplus on hand in Britain in 1861, and unable 
to f orsee the course of events of the impending American 
Civil War, the Southern fiber was a national life-line. 
To the bouthern leaders, the continuous arguments by the 
English that Britain's very existence uepended upon 
their cotton were exactly what they wanted to hear. 
These portentous arguments, expressed in commer-
cial journals, daily newspape1·s, and in the Houses of 
Parliament and supported by statistics which proved 
England received from three-fourths to five-sixths her 
total cotton supply from Am~rica, produced a smug satis-
faction among the Southern planters. Southerners were 
proud that the export commerce of the slave states was 
the richest in the world, that, in fact, for the fiscal 
year ending on June 30, 1859, exports initiating in the 
slave states were valued at ~naa. 6 million compared to 
9 
8London Economist, 1853, in Owsley, King Cotton, 11. 
9London Times, June 1, 1861, in Owsley, King Cotton, 11. 
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$5.3 million for the Northern free atatea.10 Southerners 
were proud, too• that not only England but the- United 
States and the h'uropean Continent, although on a much 
lesser scale than Great Britain, demonstrated a compar-
able reliance on ~outhern cotton.11 
But more important, Southerners were confident --
due to the positive power of cotton -- to demand secession, 
whether this be achieved peacefully through diplomatic 
channels or combatively through civil war. As this 
confidence in the dominance of cotton continued to be 
bolstered by current articles an.Ci political addressee 
bot.h in England and the Sou.th, a growing concept concern-
ing the allegiance of Great Britain to the South in case 
of an outbreak of civil war in America became increasingly 
popular. 12 Secessionist Southerners, as exemplified by 
Hammond, believed that the commercial interests of Eu?ope 
would ttema.nd a peaceful secession with no break in the 
supply of cotton. A powerful coalition of the forces 
of Eu.rope would interfere to prove that "the world must 
have the South's cotton a.t any price.nl3 
lOJohn w. Du Bose, "Confederate Diplomacy," :.:>outhern 
Historical oocietf .t'ale1's t R. A. Brook, 1'.;di tor, .X.XXII 
(Ricnmond, Virgin a: 954J, 105. 
11owsley, ~ Cotton, 14-15. 
12James M. Callahan, ~i~lomatic History .Q! ~ Southern 
Confederacy, (Baltimore, l 01), 79. 
13charles H. Wesley, ~ Collapse of !!!£..Confederacy 
(Washington, 1937), 109. 
It seemed certain that since Great Britain in 
particular was "the cotton factory of the worla,nl4 her 
economic and commercial interests would require an un-
hampered flow of cotton from America to her ahores. 
Otherwise she would intervene to restore and insure such 
a flow. The English satirical magazine, Puncht seemed 
to phrase the British viewi 
Though with the North we sympathize 
It must not be forgotten 
That with the South we've str9n.ger ties 
Which are composed of cotton.!,-
Convinced that the commercial ?Owers of the 
world "could not live with.out southern cotton, nl6 more 
and .more oouthern statesmen came out arrogantly in de-
fense of the slave states• trump card -- cotton. Led 
11 
by David Christy, who first phrased the term "king 
cotton,"17 Senator Alfred Iverson of Georgia, Major w. B. 
Chase of Floriaa, J. D. B. De Bow, the editor of the 
pro-Southern, pro-slavery ~ ~·~ Review, and Hammond, 
the bouth indicated its obsession with the idea of cotton 
140wa1ey, King Cotton, 10. 
l5Punch, Na.rch )O, 1861, in B~.B. Sideman Md L. Friedman, 
Bditors, h'Urope Looks li !!!£Civil~ (New York, 1960), 
:;6-37. 
16 Owsley, Ki!l£~ Cotton, 15. 
17navid Christy, Cotton i,! Kings Or ~laver:t !!! lli Light 
.Qf Political Economy (Cincinnati, 18'5). 
power with a thorough repetition and amplification of 
the boldest "king cotton" testimonia.ls.18 
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"The slave-holding South is now the controlling 
power of the world," announced Hammond in the fall of 
1860.19 A few months later Major Chase reported that any 
attempted blockade of the Southern ports "would be 
swept away" by a vigilant British fleet stationed near 
the ~outhern coasts to insure "the free flow of cotton 
to English factoriea."20 Senator Iverson informed the 
North in his departing speech from the Senate: "Cotton 
is king and will find some means to raise your blockade 
and disperse your ships."21 With the merits or 0 king 
cotton" now proclaimed to the world, the Southern 
political leaders retired to design an appropriate for-
eign policy which would utilize the strength of cotton 
to the fullest. 
18E. D. Adams, Great Britain and ~American Civil 
War (2 vols., New '.fork: 1925), Il,Chapter 10 "King Cotton," 
H2; and Owsley, ~ Cotton, Chapter 1 "The Foundations 
of Confederate Diplomacy, 11 1-50. 
19E. D. Adame, Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, 
66, in Adams, Britain ~ Civil ~' II, 2. 
20Major w. B. Chase, ~Bow'~ Review, New ~eriea Vol. V, 
No. 1 (January, 1861), 94-95. 
21senator Alfred Iverson, "Departing Speech to the 
United States Senate," in Gallahan, Diplomatic history .E.f. 
Coni'ecieraci£:, 79. 
13 
Meeting in Montgomery, Alacama, in early 1861, 
the Confederate Provisional Congress and Cabinet offi-
cials faced the arduous task of devising an effective and 
consietent foreign policy. From the myriad diplomatic 
plans and counter-plans which first circulated through 
the congressional halls of Montgomery, there emerged by 
February, 1861, two very definite, yet opposite, 
policy proposals. United only in their mutual dependence 
on cotton, the two plans, presented respectively by 
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman .Hobert B. Rhett and 
by :President Jefferson Davis, contrasted absolutely on 
the tactical use of cotton and on the decision to award 
either the United States or ~urope precedence in any 
initial Confederate diplomatic efforts. 
Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina, twenty years 
a member in the United States Congress, brought to the 
Confederacy a life of experience in the study of revenue 
and commercial laws.22 In the secession convention of 
South Carolina, November 13 to December 24, 1860, he had 
discussed a proposed treaty between the European commer-
cial states and the imminent ~outhern Confederacy. 23 He 
22Laura A. Wnite, "Hobert .Barnwell Rhett," in Dumas 
Malone. hditor, ~ictionar~ of American Biogra~hy (22 vela., 
New York: 1933), XV, 526- 287 
23John w. Du Bose, ~~and Times 2f. William Lowndes 
Yancey (Birmingham, Alabama: 1892), 589. 
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based this suggested treaty on the belief that if Great 
Britain were offered favorable trade inducements, she 
could be persuaded to recognize Confederate independenoe.24 
Now in the formative months of the Confederacy, Rhett 
developed a foreign policy based solely on economic 
overtures to the commercial interests of ~land and the 
Continent. 
The Bhett scheme was a three-point program to 
secure recognition throUS<:h the establishment of both 
offensive anu defensive treaties with the powers of 
' 25 ~urope. He advocated, primarily, a treaty of commer-
cial alliance between the Confederacy and England and 
France, for a duration of not less than twenty years and 
dependent, of course, on their recognition of Southern 
independence. In addition, the South would impose an 
import duty, no greater than twenty per cent, ~ valore.m, 
on British and French goods; only a basic tonnage duty 
would be levied, sufficient enough to maintain the Con-
federate harbors; and the European states would be per-
mitted coasting rights, subject only to the police 
24Edmund c. Burnett, Editor, "Dispatch from the 
British Consul ut Charle~ton to Lord John Russell, 1860," 
American Historical Review, XVIII (July, 1913), 783-787. 
25Rembert w. ~atrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana; i944), 77. --- ---
regulations of the Southern states themselves, Secondly, 
the South would impose a discriminatory tariff of ten 
per cent on all goods of all nations who refused to 
accept the treaty. Finally, Rhett advocated that the 
Confederate diplomatic commissioners be empowered, after 
the manner of Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deans, and Arthur 
Lee during the Revolutionary War, ~o form both military 
and commercial alliances with the European powers and to 
make guarantees to them concerning their North .American 
possesaions. 26 
Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs, 
arguing that "ninety per cent of war was business," 
reiterated Rhett's demand for liberal powers to the Con-
federate ministers who could negotiate treaties based on 
15 
a reciprocity of benefits. 27 By no means was the sugges-
tion by Rhett and Toombs for exceptional and compensatory 
terms of a commercial treaty original.. Rather, the 
Rhett proposal was a. "practical confronting of an 
emergency" based on the proven success of the Revolutionary 
War pacts.28 For Rhett and Toombs, then, any eoonomio 
advantages the Confederacy l1eld through control of the 
26nu Bose, Yanoey, 598-599. 
27Flora Millard, "T'he ,ll1 oreign Policy of the Confederate 
States," Confederate Veteran, XXVI (June, 1918), 246. 
28Du Bose, ''Cfonfe<ierate Diplomacy, n 106. 
16 
cotton market could best be exerted through contracts of 
a commercial nature based on the availability of the noble 
fiber. 
In summary, the Rhett-Toombs plan rested primar-
ily on the practical use of tiouthern cotton through 
trade alliances. Rhett would readily make cotton avail-
able to the European commercial powers if they accepted 
the basic Confederate condition to recognize officially 
the ~outhern government. Unlike the strategy of President 
Davis, thi~ first plan offered immediate economic advan-
tages and guarantees. It did not rely on future uncer-
tainties -- European desperation for cotton -- but on 
present realities -- a mutually favorable trade agree-
ment. 
In advocating also an immediate diplomatic 
mission to Europe, before any preliminary negotiations 
with the United States, Rhett and Toombs found an addi-
tional ally in the Confederate Vice President, Alexander 
H. Stephens. Although Stephens emphasized the retention 
of cotton as a purely commercial power more so than the 
quasi-political status which Rhett and Toombs would 
give it, he nevertheless favored early negotiations 
with Hurope in preference to the United Stated. 29 
29callahan, D.iplomatic Hietory .Q.£ Confederacy, 86. 
17 
t>tephens, while quet:itioning tho full sincerity of Europe's 
intentions towards the divided American Union, hesitated 
to rely on European intervention even with Confederate 
economic assurances. 30 Despite these reservations, 
though, Stephens bolstered the Rhett-Toombs premise, which, 
in turn, challenged the polic.Y of President Davis for 
governmental sanction.31 
Jefferson Davis, meanwhile, had followed with 
great interest the debates and discu~siona among the 
English political, financial and industrial leaders 
concerning the contingent dependence of Britain upon 
Southern cotton. Influenced still further by Christy's 
Cotton !:! ~ and similar publications and arguments 
on the American aide of the Atlantic, ''he became a 
firm believer" in the power of cotton to procure Euro-
pean intervention on the side of the Confederacy in the 
32 event of civil war with the North. Convinced that the 
30Henry Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomucyi Popular 
Notions and International Healities," Journal££ Southern 
History, XXXII, No. 2 (1"1ay, 1966), 159. 
31william L. Yancey, who later headed the first 
Confederate mission to Europe, similarly supported the 
arguments of the Rhett-Toombs forces. As we s~all see in 
succeeding chapters, he accepted the responsibility of the 
diplomatic mission with considerable reservations as to 
the success it could generate without the liberal powers of 
negotiation which Rhett sought. 
320wsley, King Cotton, 15. 
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mills of England would demand governmental action to in-
sure and protect the cotton market from the South, Davia 
proclaimed his "cotton famine" policy as the basis for 
his administration's foreign relations.33 
The "cotton famine" policy rested wholly on the 
economic importance of the staple crop. 'v/1 thout offering 
any trade alliances, Davis fervently believed that com-
mercial pressures would prostrate a suppliant Europe be-
fore "king cotton." Thus, there was no need to propose 
trade agreements contingent on Bu.ropean recognition of 
the Gonfea.eracy. To lla.vis and the 11.king cotton" patrons, 
such recognit.1.on must come -- and would come -- first 
before thl cotton became available again to Europe, In 
contraut to tne Rhett-Toomb1.::> sr.hAmP., the Davis plan ad-
vacates felt that cotton stored by the government on the 
plantations, rather than offerea in international markets, 
"was the best basis for ••• .Buropean aiplomacy. 1134 
In audition to basing his diplomacy on the im-
portance of the cotton crop, Davia further relied on the 
legality of sece~sion itself. He contended that since the 
American repubiic re8ted on the common consent of the 
j3Millard, "Foreign tolicy of Confeaerate Btates, 11 242. 
)4~'rederick ::> • .Daniel, Editor, The .Richmond Examiner 
auring the War, .2£ .:£ill:. ~iri ti~s of John !1· Daniel (New 
York, lB'bS")-;-February 26, 18 , 43'. 
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governed, "it is the right of the people to alter or abol-
ish" that government which in any way becomes "destructive 
of the ends" for which it was established. 35 In compos-
ing the new Confederacy, the sovereign states were merely 
insuring for themselves those rights which the present 
Union had violated or curtailed. As an independent en-
tity, the Confederate States were justly entitled to 
"recognition as a member of the family of nationa. 11 36 
Writing several years later, Davis revealed more 
clearly this aspect of his diplomatic views. In his 
lengthy history of the Confeaeracy, the former President 
indicated that a higher code of international morality 
demu.nded rec ogni ti on for the Confederacy. As an indepen-
dent country, the Southern Union was entitled to such re-
cognition -- the refusal of which Davis termed "unjust" 
and a breach of "the performance of a duty" which "the 
conscience of sovereigns" owed to the new etate.)7 
Davis, too, found influential allies for his moral-
istic "cotton famine" policy. In addition to the ardent 
35confeaerate States of America, A Compilation of the 
hessageu !!!'.!£?avers 2.f. ill.Confederacy, Incluaing tiie Dlp-
lomutic Correspondence, ecu. ted b! Jame.a D. Richardson 
~2 vols., Washington: 190J), I, 32. 
36 lbid., 76. 
-
37Jefferson Davis, 1'.!!! ~and Fal~ .Q.!. the Confeaerate 
Government (2 vols., New York: 1881r;--.rr, 369-370. 
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"king cotton" advocates already mentioned,38 the policy 
gathered support from such Southern leaders as Judah P. 
Benjamin, future Confederate Secretary of State, and IDd-
mund Rhett, a cousin of Robert Rhett of South Carolina, 
who declared that because of England's need for cotton 
"you British must recognize ue before the end of October 
(1861)."39 ~ecretary of the Treasury Christopher G. Mem-
minger similarly voiced "cotton famine" sympathies by 
confidently supporting a complete halt of all cotton ship-
ments to Europe until the anticipated pressure of the 
famine would necessitate European intervention and recog-
nition to again restore the cotton flow. 40 Memminger•s 
idea of hastening the cotton fa.Illine in Europe through a 
restrictive embargo on the valuable staple was by no means 
his alone. Throughout the first year of the war, the idea 
was both a popular one and an enthusiastically pursued 
one. 41 
The Rhett and Davis plans clashed on the floors of 
the ~rovisional Congress meeting in Montgomery in the early 
38see pages 11-12. 
39s1r William H. Russell, M,l Diary North ~ South 
(2 vols., New York: 1863), I, 70. 
40Daniel, Richmond Examiner during ~ ~' 43. 
4l0n the cotton embargo, discussed as it affected in-
itial diplomatic missions to Europe by the Confecieracy, 
see Chapter V below. 
21 
weeks oi' February, 1861. 42 The commercial treaty re-
solution defended by Rhett and Toombs was presented to 
the Congress for consideration with little change from 
the original draft. In fact, only a suggestion by John 
Perkins of Louisiana which reduced the stipulation of the 
trade alliance from twenty to six years was noteworthy.43 
Despite the practicality and validity of their 
argument, the 11.hett-Toomba forces could not realize the 
support they needed for adoption of their resolution. 
Pre;siuent Davis neither appreciGited nor accepted the 
propositions of his ~ecretary of State and the Chairman 
of ~he Committee on Foreign Helations. Relying on a 
policy which accented the economic importance of the 
South to the world and on a platform which defended the 
moral right of secession and consequently demanded recog-
nition, Davis could not compromise with such an adverse 
42The Journal of the ~rovisional Congress Qf ~ .Q..Q!!.-
federate :3tates .Q.f. Amerj.ca, unlike the Congressional 
Globe, is extremely deficient in its treatment of Congres-
sional debates. In the Journal we can only follow the 
various resolutions concerning foreign affairs and reports 
of the implementation of these resolutions. ~:iince there 
was a notable difference of opinion between the Hhett-
Toombs faction and the Davis wing concerning the approach 
to diplomatic relations, we must assume, therefore, that 
differences were apparent in private sessions and committeE 
meetings. t>ee proceeuings of the Provisional Congress in 
Journal .Qf ~ Congress .Q.f the Confeaer~te btates of ~­
ica (7 vols., Waf:>hington: l':N4-1905), I, 7-158. 
43Du Bose, Yance;y, 600-601. 
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plan as the others offered. 
In reality, the Davis plan had already been put 
into operation with the dispatch of three commissioners 
to the United States before his final rejection of 
Rhett's scheme. :E1or all practical purposes, he and his 
fellow "king cotton" patrons had fully committed the 
;:>outh to the "cotton famine" policy. For better or for 
worse, the Confeci.eracy and a distinctive Southern for-
eign policy had been joined together to win international 
recognition and assistance. Although Rhett continued as 
Chairman of the Foreign Helations Committee, Toombs 
shortly resigned his post as 0ecretary of State. 44 In 
doing so, he fully acknowledged the inoperativeness to 
which his department was relegated through the a.dminis-
tration' B acceptance of the "cotton famine" program.45 
44For a further explunation of Toombs' resignment as 
Gecretary of Gtate, see Chupter V, footnote No. l, below. 
451,atrick, Davis ~ ~ Uabinet, 86. 
CHAPTER II 
THltEE DI}LaviATS IN SEARCH OF A MISSION 
On February 25, 1861, as the first official dip-
lomatic act of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis author-
ized the appointment of three commissioners to the United 
States. 1 This action, in direct opposition to the "Eur-
opean-first" suggestions of the abandoned Rhett-Toombs 
plan, gambled that secession might be peaceably achieved 
with little or no hindrance on the part of the Federal 
goverrunent. Davis, in an attempt to demonstrate "that a 
civilized and moderate administration had assumed the reins 
of' the Confederate government, 112 pressed on Washington the 
demand for recognition, which, he contended, the legality 
-Of secession ordered. 
In his controversial history, The Rise and Fall 
of the Confederate Government, Davia indicated that the 
moral righteousness of secession would necessitate Union 
capitulation and eventual European recognition.3 He 
lRichardson, f11essages ™ Papers of Confederacy, I, 55. 
2 . 
Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomacy," 156. 
3see footnote No. 37, Chapter I, for a complete cita-
tion of Davis' Rise and. !!'all, and a further explanation of 
the views whichhe"v'OICed in it. 
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qualified this statement with examples of the stability 
and strength of unification which the Confederacy had 
exhibited to him throughout the four years of the war. 
However, in February, 1861, there was no independent 
Southern experience to cite. .ttatner, the entire argument 
for secession which the "first envoys of the cotton 
kingdom 11 4 presented was this idealistic conception that 
secession was not only legally, but also morally, justi-
fied. .Rhett, Toombs, ~tephens, Yancey and others warned 
that a commission to the United States based solely on 
the Davis premise could not possibly succeed. Yet, 
rejecting the practical warnings of his political adver-
saries, Davis directed Confederate diplomacy along a 
path which they regarded inept. 
Martin J. Crawford, John Forsythe and A. B. 
Roman arrived in Washington on March 5, 1861, the day 
after the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln. On "princi-
ples of right, justice, equity, and good faith, 11 5 they 
petitioned both the President and his Secretary of State, 
William Henry Seward, for interviews. "With a view to a 
4owsley, King Cotton, 51. 
5 11 A Resolution for the Appointment of Commissioners 
to the Government of the United States of America," 
.February 15, 1861, in Richardson, Messages and Papers Qf. 
Confederacy, I, 55. 
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speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of ••• 
(the) political separation, 11 6 the commissioners anxiously 
awaited a reply. 
On March 15, Secretary Seward, through a State 
Department memorandum, "respectfully declined" to enter 
into any negotiations with the Confederate commissioners. 
He acknowledged to the Southern delegation that he was 
fully aware of the "events ••• and. conditions of politi-
cal affairs 0 which cu.rrently existed .between the states 
of the Union. However, Seward viewed the Southern coali-
tion of states not as a result of a "r.ightful and accom-
plished revolution and (hence) an independent nation," 
but as ".a perversion of a temporary and partisan excite-
ment'' which he confidently expected soon would be brought 
to an end •. To Forsythe, Crawford and Roman, the Secretary 
of State admitted "that he has no authority" to recognize 
their credentials as diplomatic agents from a non-existent 
and extra-legal foreign state. 7 
For nearly a month the three Southern representa-
tives remained in Washington. Although they never met 
6"Letter of John Forsythe and Martin J. Crawford to 
William H. Seward, March 15, 1861," in Dunbar Rowland, 
Jefferson Davis,· Constitutionalist: ~ Lette1·s, Papers 
!:!!!£.Speeches (10 vols., Jackson, Mias.: 1923), V, 86. 
?"Department of tltate N.emorandum, March 15, 1861," in 
Rowland, Jefferson lJavis: Constitutionalist, V, 87-91. 
with Seward, -chey continued to send him notes in wh;i.ch 
they reiterated the familiar demands and principles for 
recognition. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Jo.hn A. Campbell. who later served as the Conf'ederate 
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assistant secretary of war, relayed many of these messages 
to Seward while serving in an unofficial capacity as an 
intermediary between the two forcea.8 Nevertheless, 
the Federal position remained as firm and determined to 
resist the Southern overtures as the Confederacy was to 
attain her independence. With the outbreak of hostilities 
at Fort Sumter on the morning of April 12, all preliminary 
negotiations with the United States ceased and the Con-
federate commissioners withdrew from their Washington 
posts. 
While the abortive mission to the United States 
was still in progress, Davis and his foreign policy 
advisors realized that the Confederate request for recog-
nition ana independence would not immediately be forth-
coming from the Union. The Crawford-Forsythe-Roman mission, 
sentenced to failure through inadequacies of both purpose 
and method, futilely remained in Washington despite their 
initial rejection. The senselessness of any prolonged 
8walter Chandler, "Diplomatic History of the Southern 
Confederacy," Confederate Veteran, XXX (December, 1922), 
241-242. 
stay by these commisaioners in the North's capital, so 
aptly demonstrated by the inability of the mission to 
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even meet with Seward, much less win recognition, demanded 
that the Confederacy redirect its diplomacy to seek from 
the states of hurope that recognition and support which 
the northern states of America firmly and unequivocally 
withheld. 
In accoraance with the nomination of Davis, on 
March 16, 1861, Confederate becretary of ctate Robert 
M. T. Toombs appointed the initial Southern diplomatic 
mission to the major states of Europe.9 To William L. 
Yancey of Alabama, Ambrose Dudley Mann of Virginia, and 
Pierre A. Rost of Louisiana, he entrusted the Confederate 
hopes for immediate European recognition and assistance. 
9.Pickett .lJa.pers, Toombs to Yancey, Rost and Mann, 
March 16, 1861. The principal primary source used in the 
research for this paper wa~ the Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Confederate States of 
America. These papers, located in the Manuscript Division 
of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., consist of 
a number of portfolios which catalogue, according to 
country, the various correspondence of the Southern diplo-
matic agents. .The bulk of this collection, and the sec-
tions witn which this study is particularly concerned, 
are the Pickett Papers. These papers contain most of the 
diplomatic correspondence of the European commissioners, 
and until additional manuscripts were added to the collec-
tion, served as the official source for all Confederate 
foreign relations records. 8ince the Pjckett l>apers were 
used extensively in the reeearcn for this paper, they shall 
be referred to specifically rather than to the entire 
Official Records collection in future citations. 
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Born in 1814, William Lowndes Yancey, the youngest 
of the three appointees, wal:l certainly the best known 
member of the com.mission. 'r.hrough his years in the Ala-
bama ana United States Congresses, Yancey gradually and 
totally changed from a unionist Congressional sympathizer 
to a staunch states rights orator. 10 By the time of the 
Democratic presidential convention in Charleston, South 
Carolina, during the winter and spring of 1860, Yancey 
took the lead in open avowance of the right of secession 
and the concept of Southern solidarity. Demanding 
Federal protection to slavery in the territories, Yancey 
ardently called for the secession of Southern members 
from the convention ii' their terms were denied. 11 He 
assumed the reins of secet:3sionist leadership in this 
convention and became t.ne chief manager for the movement 
in the months ahead. 
As an eloquent and influential speaker, a man 
who "had no equal in the South, 0 12 Yancey could hardly be 
dismissed from consideration as one of the leaders who 
lOA. L. Venable, "William L. Yancey's Transition from 
Unionism to States' Rights," Journal£! SoutHern ·History, 
X (August, 1944), 331-388. 
11Anthony W. Dillard, "William L. Yancey: The Sincere 
and Unfaltering Advocate of ~outhern Rights," M.on1;gomery 
Daily Advertiser (April 15, 1893), in ~outhern Historical 
~ociety Papers, XXI (1893), 154-156. 
12~., 155. 
woulu direct the new Confederacy. Yet his "unguarded 
eloquence and chronic dissatisfaction with the existing 
regime"l3 made Yancey as much a threat to the new order 
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of government as an aid. He consistently urged the re-
opening of the slave trade, and although the Confederate 
government shared his states rights and pro-slavery senti-
ments, the militancy of his arguments prevented any full 
endorsement of acceptance of them. 
Like Hhett and Toombs, Yancey expected nothing of 
consequence from the mission to Washington which could 
justify the delay in establishing diplomatic relations 
with the commercial powers of EuroDe.14 In aadition, he 
firmly believed that any commissioners to Europe should 
be empowered to negotiate commercial treaties. Yet in 
defining very narrowly the direction and scope of Con-
federate diplomacy, Yancey at first neither expected nor 
desired appointment to the mission. 
Just why Yancey, an aspirant to the presidency 
of tbe Confederate Btates, accepted the mission to E'urope 
is a minor mystery. The fact that he accepted the commis-
sion without the instructions or powers which he admittedly 
esteemed essential to the success of the delegation only 
13Bur~on J. Hendrick, Statesmen Qf ~~Gause (New 
York, 1939), 141. 
l4Du Bose, Yancey, 5~6. 
deepens the mystery. His biographer, John Witherspoon 
Du Bose, oomments inadequately on this problem. To 
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Du Bose, Yancey consented to the mission "with charac-
teristic valor" out of mere patriotism to the Confederate 
cause. 15 Du Bose further announces that his overpower-
ing personal zeal to defend to the utmost the principle 
of secession moved Yancey to consent "to his own sacri-
fice. "16 
It seems Du Bose has entered an explanation based 
on convenience rather than actuality. Granted, Yancey 
was an influential Southern personality, but he was an 
individual who did nothing "that placed him above the aver-
age patriot of the day. 1117 More than one historian has 
concluded that Yancey's radicalism -- radical even 
beyond the slavocracy outcries of the Southern gentry 
could not be tolerated in the high places of Confederate 
government. 18 In eulogizing slavery and advocating a 
15nu Bose, "William L. Yancey in History," Richmond Times, 
October 31, 1899; also, Du Bose, Yancey, Chapter XXV, ''Con-
federate Diplomacy," 572-627. 
16Du Bose, "Yancey in history." 
l7p. L. Rainwater, "Notes on ~outhern :Personalities: 
William L. Yancey," Journal Qi. Southern History, IV (19j8), 
220. 
18
rn addition to Rainwater, Anthony Dillard (see 
footnote .No. 11) and Burton Hendrick tsee footnote No. 13) 
voiced similar skepticism as to the super-patriotism of 
Yancey. Frank Owsley and B. D. Adams further joined 
these historians in substan~iating Yancey's undesirabil-
ity in the ~outh on account of his radical sentiments. 
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complete destruction of the Union and the Cont:1titution, 
Yancey was a Southern extremist of the first rank. He not 
only suggested a re-opening of the African slave trade, 
but also insisted that enough black men should be im-
ported "to provide every Southerner, rich and poor, 
city dweller to hillbilly, with at least one slave."19 
Such drastic proposals, though approved by the minority 
Bouthern fire-eaters, did not fit the image of democratic 
righteousness which the Confederacy attempted to project. 
The mission to Europe offered Yancey's political oppo-
nents an ideal opportunity to rid the South of hie 
• 
dangerous oratory. 
Yancey, too, thwarted in his presidential aspira-
tions, must surely have realized the senselessness to re-
main in the South with any hopes of regaining nia pre-
secession influence. Although he outwardly voiced re-
luctance against the mission, his acute understanding of 
the internal political situation of the South must surely 
have overridden his objections to the mechanics of the 
commission. Thus, as tht: head of a diplomatic corps 
which based its arguments on the debatable impor~ance of 
the cotton crop. Yancey found it expedi.ent to compromise 
personal conviction with political reality. When Rhett 
19Hendrick, ~tatesmen 2.£ ~Cause, 140. 
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heard that Yancey's diplomacy would be based on the just-
ice of the cause and cotton, he warned the commissioner·: 
"Sir, you have no business in Europe. 1120 But with no 
business in the Confederate ~tates either, Yancey grudg-
ingly accepted the responsibility of the mission -- a 
mission which dubiously extolled his patriotism, but 
which definitely demonstrated his pragmatism. 
Ambrose Dudley Mann, a native of Virginia, was 
the only experienced diplomat among the trio. For 
several years he served inconspicuously as a minister to 
the German states while stationed at Bremen. He nego-
tiated some minor commercial treaties with Hungary (1849) 
and Switzerland (1850) before being recalled to the 
United States. His final position in service to the 
Federal government wus as Assistant Secretary of State 
to William L. Marcy from 1853-1856. 21 
Adept in trade and commercial matters, Mann 
drew popular Southern attention to himself, when, in 1858, 
he advocated the adoption of a direct ~team.ship line from 
Southern ports to Europe. 22 His pro-Southern and states 
rights B~ntiment~ drew endorsement from Yanoey, Hammond, 
20nu Bose, Yancey, 600. 
21Gullahan, Diplomatic history £!. Confederacy, 85. 
220wsley, "Ambrose Dudley Nann, 11 in Malone, Dictionary 
of American Biography, VI, 23':1-240. 
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De Bow and others. 23 By the time of the secessionist 
movement, his suggestions to eliminate Southern vassal-
age to Northern industry and commerce had already been 
translated into action and Nann was a logical Confederate 
foreign diplomat. 
But experience, ~habby though it was, and pro-
~outhern sympat!.ies do not necessarily make a diplomat. 
Mann clearly demonstrated this. Robert Bunch, British 
Consul at Charleston, sarcastically reported that Mann, 
"the son of a bankrupt grocer,"held a reputation 
which was "not good. 1124 Yet, his reputation was only 
suspect by the very fact that it was based UJJon an 
indifferent career and a flamboyant personality. 
There doesn't see1;, to be any grounds for a 
popular movement to ria. the Confeaeracy of Mann as there 
was with Yancey. Logic ally, llis record as a foreign 
service representative indicated some basis for his 
appointment. A:::> an inaividuai., 0wsley charact.erizes 
him as u man who "seemea to have stepped out of the 
pages of a book. 112 5 ]'ull of bombastic phraseB and 
sophomoric sentiments, l'·iann was a diplomatic Polonius, 
23owsley, "Ambrose Dudley l"lann," in Malone, Dictionary 
of American Biography, VI, 239-240. 
24Adams, Britain~ Civil fil, I, 63. 
~)5 
Owsley, Kint~ Cotton, ?2. 
capable of doing his government harm in every situation. 
His credulity and lack of perspective tinged all of 
his diplomatic correspondence. Yet aside from these 
glaring inadequacies, Mann possessed a certain social 
charm which enabled him to penetrate inner circles a.nd 
to establish contacts among influential people. 26 
The South could not have chosen a more inade-
quate candidate to complete the commission than the 
t.nird appointee, Pierre A. Rost. 27 Born in .Prance, 
Rost moved to Louisiana in 1816. He served briefly in 
the Mississippi legislatur·e in 1826. At the time of 
hin diplomatic appointment, he held a judgeship in the 
::>upreme Court of' Louisiana.28 Relatively obscure 
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throughout the South, and with no previous diplomatic 
experience, Rost seems to owe his commission to his contacts 
with Judah ?. Benjamin, later Confederate i:iecretary of 
27rn criticizing the appointments of Yancey, Rost 
and Mann, the author does not intend so much as to suggest 
better candidates, as he does to indicate the poor selec-
tivity of these three men in particular. Later diplo-
matic assignments of' the Confederacy -- James Iv'iason to 
1ngland, John clidell to France, Colonel John ~ickett 
to Mexico, a.nu Henry Hotze as commercial agent to 
Europe -- indicated that the ~outh did have available 
competent individuals who could satisfactorily asaume a 
foreign service position. But in appointing these more 
qualified men after tne initial diplomatic failures, the 
Confederacy unwittingly operated in Oana-like fashion 
from which nothing short of a miracle could have achieved 
succeus. 
28 Callahan, Diplomatic History £[ Confederacy, 85. 
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Secretary of State, and Pre~ident Davis. 
As a native-born Frenchman, Rost purported to 
have a thorough knowledge of the foreign language, and 
this, no doubt, contributed to his otherwise negligible 
diplomatic skills. Yet, his knowledge of French seems to 
have been just as negligible. Paul Du Ballet, a displaced 
ooutherner who remained in Paris .throughout t.he war, re-
ported that Rost 's broken Ji'rench was a source of constant 
ridicule and embarrassment to him. Questioning the 
decision of Davis to send such a dubious character on 
such an important mission, Du Bellet asked: "Has the 
~outh no sons capable of representing our country?"29 
It is not too difficult to echo Du Bellet's 
query and to expand it to include the entire commission. 
Although they we.re not, as Owsley describes, "the 
poorest choices possible, 11 30 they were far from the 
best. All three were extreme pro-slavery advocates and 
eager secessionists. To send such men to the major 
European capitals flaunted the Old World's anti-slavery 
sentimentality. Moreover. the selection of Rost, a 
nouveau riche expatriate, "rather offended than pleased 
291-'aul Du Bellet, "The ])iplomacy of tne Confederate 
Cabinet," 13-16. A typed copy of this criticism of 
Southern diplomacy and aiplomats is contained in the 
Pickett .t>apers. 
300wsley, Ki~ Cotton, 51. 
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~1rench officials." 3l Yet into the hands of these three 
inappropriate selections the Confederate State Depart-
ment entrusted a policy equally unrealistic and inconsis-
tent with the demands of international politics. 
In the same communication in which the appoint-
ment was made, Toombs outlined the State Department's 
instructions to the ministers.32 For the most pa.rt, these 
instructions reflected the policy and approach which 
Davis ordered. These same instructions, inadequate as 
they were inflexible, continued as the main Confederate 
pol.icy for the; duration of the war.33 Because of their 
persistent use, and despite their negligible success, 
it is necessary now to evaluate and understand them. 
Toombs outlined very specifically the direction 
and argument for the Confederate mission. i'he commissioners 
31Hendrick, Statesmen .Q! ~ Cause, 140. 
32Pickett Papers, Toombs to Yancey, Rost and Mann, 
March 16, 1861. The following paragraphs, pages 36 
to 40 are baseci on the ins true tions of Toombs to the 
commissioners. 
33The major deviation from the direction of Confederate 
diplomacy a.a initiated by the ~ancey-Rost-Mann mission oc-
curred in the closing months of the war with the establish-
ment of the Kenner Mission. Offered in March, 1865, the 
Kenner plan was a direct proposal on the part of the 
Confederate State Department to abolish slavery in return 
for Jmg~is.h acknowledgment of the ~out.h's independence. 
The plan had been designed by Judah l?. Benjamin and indicated 
by its proposed terms the la:..>t futility and desperation of 
the Confederate position. 
were instructed to visit Greut Britain, France, Ruseia 
and Belgium ana to announce to these countries that the 
Confederate States had "severed their connections with 
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the United States" and had formed an independent govern-
ment, "endowad with every attribute of sovereignty and 
powers necessary to entitle them to assume a place among 
the nations of the world." Af'ter listing several of their 
grievances against the United States which prompted the 
Confederate action,34 Toombs ordered the ministers to 
ask for the admission of the Confederacy into the 
"family of independent nations" and to obtain "that 
acknowledgment and friendly recognition which are due to 
every people capable of self-government and ••• the 
power to maintain their independence." Toombs further 
cited that Davis and the Southern citizenry confidently 
expected "the enlightened Government of Great Britain" 
to quickly accept Confederate independence and extend 
diplomatic recogni.tion. 
After -- and only after -- the attainment of recog-
nition, Yanc.:ey, Rost and .Mann were further instructed to 
34Toombs contended that sinue 1828, the indu~trial 
Northern stateo hc.td compelledthe 8outh to "pay bounties" 
to them through the imposition of' a high protective tariff. 
Through this annual "extortion, 11 the Secretary claimed 
that serious attempts were m&de to overthrow the proaper-
i ty, social ~Yb~em, and self-rule of the Southern states. 
He stressed that these grievances were not immediate or 
hastily construed ones, but had been bui.l t up for decades. 
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negotiate treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation 
with England. It is important to stress this aspect of 
their instructions. Nowhere were the commissioners em-
powered to negotiate treaties of any nature unless the 
requirement of formal recognition had been obtained. 
Thus, the edge of Confederate initiative was completely 
removed. These instructions placed the fate of the 
mission solely in the d~plomatic decisions of Great 
Britain rather than on the diplomatic efforts of the 
Confederate agents. 
In keeping with the principles of a policy baaed 
predominantly on the potential coercive power of cotton. 
Toombs ordered the commissioners to convince England of 
the advantages of an alliance with the cotton capital. 
He advised the diplomats to remind Great Britain of her 
dependency on "king cotton" and of "the condition to 
which the British realm would be reduced" if the cotton 
supply should suddenly diminish or cease.35 In addition, 
tne Secretary of St1:1.te announced, with one major reserva-
tion, th<:Lt all existing treaties between the United 
States and England would continue in effect with the 
35As sriown below, this instruction by Toombs to con-
stantly remind the british of their precarious economic 
situation grauually antagonized the British statesmen. 
If' the English economic system was in jeopardy, Englishmen 
hardly needed, or endured, consistent reminders to this 
effect from the Southern diplomats. 
government of the Confederate States. 
The single exception was the Webster-Aahburton 
Treaty, which, in addition to settling the northeastern 
boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, provided for 
a United States naval force off the coast of Africa to 
suppress the African slave trade. Toombs reported, that 
although Confederacy already "prohibited the slave 
trade" and intended "in good faith to prevent it" in 
the South, his government could. not comply with this 
obligation. Toombs failed to elaborate the Confederate 
position of non-compliance with the Webster-Ashburton 
Treiaty; but, then again, how does one exp_lain moral 
propriety on the one hand with social injustice on the 
other? 
Besides the standard passports and letters of 
introduction to the foreign affairs ministers of the 
various target nations, the commissioners carried with 
them a complete set of the laws of the United States, a 
copy of Wheaton'~ International ~' and a $1,000.00 a 
month salary. Any additional expenses postage, news-
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papers, entertainment fees, stationery must be absorbed 
by the diplomats themselves. Since a secondary function 
of the mission was to report on ~!the policy and views of 
the Government" to which the ministers were assigned, the 
failure by the Confederate State Department to grant the 
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commissioners compensation f'or their r€gular correspondent 
efforts demonstrated both an incompetent allotment of 
funds anci confidence in a speedy diplomatic success. 
With no creditable diplomatic experience behind 
them, with no expense account to subsidize them, and with 
no realistic policies to guide them, Yancey, Host and 
Mann departed for }.;urope. Tiley carried with them the 
hopes and expectations of a secessionist coalition of 
Southern states. They would shortly find that the 
"enlightened" European states, which Toombs alluded 
to, dealt not in popular emotionalism but rather in 
political opportunism. 
CHAPTER III 
A E.1JROPEAN DEBUT :B10R SOUTHERN DIPLOMA.CY 
Having received their instructions and creden-
tials, the three commissioners immediately set out for 
Europe. Yancey and Rost, traveling together, arrived 
in London on April 29.l Mann, who had ta.ken a different 
route by way of Washington, reached England on May 15.2 
The Confederates were greeted in London by Williaru H. 
Gregory, a Conservative-Liberal active member of Parlia-
ment and one of the most ardent cham~ions of the South, 
who, with a host of other prominent Englishmen, comprised 
the influential bouthern lobby.3 
This pro-Con:federate lobby of native English 
propagandists contributed valuable assistance to the 
Southern dip1omats throughout the entire war effort. 
Through their influence on the Liberal govei·nm.ent and in 
lp1ckett Papers, Diopatch No. 1, Yancey, Rost and Mann 
to Toombs, Hay 21, 1861. 
2For a full account of Mann's trip from the South to 
Great Britain, see: J. l'. Moore, "Lincoln and the Escape 
of the Confederate Commissioner Ambrose .Dudley Mann," 
Illinois State Historical Society Journal, LVII (Spring, 
1964), 23-29. 
3Aaams, Britain fil1£ the Civil War, I, 90-91. 
Parliament, through their efforts to mobilize public 
opinion for the Confederacy, and through their per-
suasiveness in private industry, the lobbyists assured 
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the Confederacy that segments of the British population 
vciced pro-::iouthern sympathies. More often than not, 
Yancey, Host and Mann, by associating almost exclusively 
with the British aristocracy that comprised the lobby, 
tended to exaggerate the lobbyists' overly optimistic 
reports. As a result of such misleading and tainted 
information from their .British contacts, the commissioners 
often relayed delusive information to the Confederate 
capital. 
It is the duty of a valuable diplomat, though, 
to sift and evaluate the information he receives and to 
draw objective conclusions from it. Through the re-
strictive nature of their contacts and the tendency of 
the t;outhern ministers to grasp any loose straws of 
encouragement, this first mission to .t:;urope established 
defective precedents. This poor reportorial ability 
of the Southern diplomats, begun with Yancey, Rost, and 
Viann, continued to plague and mislead the Confederate 
government throughout the war years. Yet the blame for 
these operational failures of the mission rests as much 
with the commissioners t.hem:::;elves as it does with the 
Confederate ~itate Department which accredited such in-
experienced and emotionully-guided individuals. 
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In addition to Gregory, James I•I. Spence, William 
S. Lind.say, Alexander J. Beresford-Hope, Lor·d Robert 
l'•Iontague and others contributed their time and efforts 
to the ~outhern cause. 4 Although they expounded the 
virtues of the Sout.t1, an iaealistic belief in the 
righteousness of the Confederate fight for independ.ence 
was not t.he sole motive of these British sympathizers. 
Many, like Lindsay and the Laird brothers, prominent 
English ship-builders, were certainly affected as much 
by economic opportunity through cotton speculation and 
trade advantages as by an idealistic temperament. 
Others, like Eustace and Robert Cecil, cieymour Fitzgerald 
and Lord Campbell, saw in the American Civil War the 
chance to evince long pent-up hostilities against the 
United btates.5 In any event, the prospect of a vast 
free trade market in the Confederacy,. the dissol vement 
4owsley, ~ Cotton, 62. In addition to the several 
lobbyists who axe listed throughout the body of the paper, 
other influential bnglishmen who contributed substantially 
to the Confederate cause were; Justice Haliburton, Bir. 
E. C. Kerrison, J. T. Hopwoou, G. M. W. Peacocke, w. 
Vansi ttart, W. E. Duncombe, :::ii1· James Fergussen and James 
~1iteside, all Cone~rvatives; and Frederick Feel, ~ecre­
tary to the Treasury. In the ilouoe of Lords, Lord Wharn-
cliffe, a great mine-owner, the Earl of Donoughmore, and 
the Narquess of Lothian were the most ardent men who com-
pr:i sed the Confederate lobby, see: Donaldson JorO.an and 
Edwin J. Pratt, Europe and the .American Civil War (New York, 
1931), 89-91. . ~ ~ 
5owsley, King Cotton, 62, 172. 
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of the high tariffs of the Union, and the potential 
benefit to British manufacturers and shippers from the 
de.feat of their Northern competitoi·s induced the upper 
class couunercial powers of Britain to favor the Soutp. 
Until the arrival of Henry Hotze, a prominent 
~outhern newspaperman who assumed the direction of the 
Confederate propaganda program in Europe in November, 
1861, 6 the douthern lobbyists delivered their appeals 
for Confederate support through letters to the leading 
English newspape.rs, speeches, ancl a. limitea num:oer of 
topical books and pami)hlets. 7 Hotze, shortly after his 
arrival in Great Britain, established ~ Index, the 
pro-~>outhern paper which became the official mouth-
piece of the Confederate lobby. But more important 
for the moment than these nationwide appeals to the 
6Jordan, ~'urope ~American Civil~' 166-167. 
7'11he most effective propaganda work by a member of the 
Southern lobby was ::Jpence'.s American Union. In this book, 
~pence outlin8d the b~sic aifferences between the North 
and the bouth and. argued convincingly .for the l:lovereignty 
of the American ;:;tat8l:l an<1 tht·ir constitutional right to 
secede. .England' the l~ortn rn ill. tiouth by .Beretiford-
Hope c.nu A Hirror in America b.y Lord Montague both contained 
bitter attac:Ks on tne North and voiced arguments for the 
recognition of t>outaern independence. In addition to these 
monogra1JhS, ::;everal pamphlets, among them ~ American 
~u~etion in §:. Nutshell by Hugo Reid and Englan<i and ~ 
Dit:Jrupted. 0t~te~.; of America by Tnomas C. Grattan, similarly 
voiced pro-oouthern ::3entimtJn1.t:. Jfor a mor'e thorough 
lit'3'ting of the propaganua wri tirit:;s by the Southern lobby 
in .r~ngland, uee ~ Owsley, King Cotton, "The Na.ti ve 
l'ropagandists," 171-17'3. 
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~nglish people was the work of the lobbyists to assure 
debate on the America:: crisis in .. Parlia::ent am.i to ~;u(1tu·c 
for the Confederate commissioners interviews with 
Lord John Russell, the British ]'oreign ::>ecretary. On 
l'•lay 3, 1861, principally through the efforts of Gregory, 
the f'ir::;t vital meeting between the tiouthern delegation 
and Russell took place. 
The tnitial conference with .Russell was a strictly 
informal affair at which the Confederate ministers 
neither presented their credentials nor officially 
stated their purpose, but merely participated in "an 
informal interchange of views upon American affairs.~8 
H.ussell informed the envoys that "it would give him 
pleasure" to hear exactly what they had to comrnunicate, 
yet "under present circuro.stci.nces," he would have little 
to say.9 Under these discouraging terms, YWtcey and 
Rost proceeded to elaborate the Confederate position as 
outlined in their instructions. 
8r1ckett J:lapers, Dispatcn No. 1, Yancey, Rost and Nann 
to Toombs, May 21, 1861. Uome diplomatic correspondence 
in the Pickett Papers, Library of Congre~s, has been pub-
lished in Volume 3, i.:>eriel> 11 of the ttij_rty-one volu..11e 
Officinl Hecords of the Union and Confederate Navies in 
the War of the rte belllon (Washington, D. C.: 1922). ThiB 
series, however, hus appe:_i.red in only one printing and 
was initiully selective of the materials in the Fickett 
Papera. Primary reliance he1ein is upon the original 
manuscript collection. The Official Hecords are useful 
for supJJlemcntary guiciance and comparative purposes. 
9 lEl!!· 
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The commissioners stressed the legality of 
secession in their presentation to Russell. They placed 
particular e~phasis on the democratic principles of self-
government which demanded and directed the formation of 
the Uonfederute ;;>tates. In ccnclusion, the Southern agents 
noted "the ability of the Confederacy to defend their 
position" and the elemen'ts of IJermanency and the poten-
tia1ities of cornmercial success imbued in the Uouthern 
peo~le. In all this the Uonfeaerates reported thut 
iiussell "manifested rnuch inteI·est. n He concluded the 
interview with an indication that the matter of Southern 
recognition would soon be brought up for Cabinet con-
sultdtion.10 
All in all, it was an unobtrusive effort to stress 
the constitutional lights which had Brompted secession and 
to suggest the service to world peace and the benefits 
to English economy which an immediate recognition of 
the Confederate Lltates would hChieve. Alt.i10ugh the 
dispatch of Yancey, host, and Hann to the State Depart-
ment concerning the interview inuicc.1.ted that the atmos-
phere was c ontsenial and the 0ecretary wa:J amicable, the 
whole tone of the letter reflected an optilliism w11ich !lad 
10..t'ickett .h.ip1:.:.rs, Di spa ten No. 1, Yuncey, lmut and 
Nann to 'l\001u.us, Nay 21, H3bl. 
U.tt1e basiu. The general result of the confrontation 
was that Russell listened, but definitely refused to 
commit himself to any guarantees of recognition, The 
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commission was forced, not by consent but by the inade-
quacies of their instructions, to play a waiting game 
with the British. Thus the Confederate policy limita-
tions aguirwt any initiatives by the ministers --
limitations wrlich H.hett, Toombs anu Yancey warned against 
wonths earlier -- appeared in the early operations of the 
mission. Alt.hough the minis ter·s implied that they were 
content to wait on British action, in rE:ality they had 
no other choice. 
During the first weeks of the Confederate dele-
gation's stay in England, "British foreign policy wa:;; 
rapidly matured and announced, 11 11 Basically, Hussell 
proposed a recognition of the belligerency of the Con-
federate States to be proclaimed in a joint resolution 
with France. Working for the most part without the 
interference and to a large extent without the knowl-
edge of the Southern repreHent~tives, the British Foreign 
Oli'ice announced the Neutrality Proclamation on .May 13, 1861. 12 
11Adams, Brituin ~the Civil~' I, 87. 
12 Owsley, Kin{~ Gatton, 5d. 
The British position indicated primarily the 
desire on the part of the English commercial in~erests 
to avoid a maritime war. By recognizing Confederate 
belligerency, England assured a continuation of her 
commerce with the Southern states by granting to the 
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Confederate merchant marine the same 1;rivileges in 
neutral ports which the J!,ederal ships enjoyed.13 Though 
ha1dly recognizing Confederate independence, the Neutral-
ity iroclamation temporarily elevated the statuo of the 
Confederacy to a plane comparable in international law 
to that of the United btat0s. The united british and 
French stand inaici:itt;d q_ui Le une4_ui vocally, though, that 
any recognition of independence would. be dictated by 
future events. Neverthele::;s, a proclamation in favor of 
Confederate belligerency seemed to be a definite step in 
the progression to formal recognition in the minus of the 
Llouthernenvoys. It is again irni.iortant to note, however, 
t.hL;.t the British decision occurred through no influence 
by Yancey, Rost and lvi.ann, w.notie presene e in England must 
alreaciy have seemed t>omewha~ ouperfluous. 
As British policy developed in the first two 
weeks of l"iay, 1861, i:;he Confeo.erate commissioners pressed 
lJNorman A. Graebner, ".Northern Diplomacy and Euro-
pean i'~~utrali ty," in llavia. Donald, .Editor, Why the North 
11/on tlie Civil War (Buton lwuge, Louit:d.ana.: 1':;160),56. 
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Russell for a second interview. On May 9, the ministers 
met with the Foreign decretary.14 Little did they 
realize that already the operations of Union counter-
diplomacy were at work which would make this second 
interview witn Russell the last personal encounter 
between the Yancey-Rost-Mann mission and the British 
.h"'oreign Of fie e. 
The primary reuson for this second meeting was 
to relay to Hussell informa~ion which the Southerners 
h~d recently received in two dispatches from Toombs. 
A short letter, dated April 2, informed the commissione:rb 
that the Confederate constitution hari been ratified by 
aeven states and vut into effect.15 Three weeks later, 
however, they received Diupo.tch No. 2 from Toombs which 
announced the beginning of hostilities between the North 
and the South and wl1ich contained supplementary instruc-
tions for the ministers.16 The 8ecretury of State relayed 
details of the taking of lfort Sumter and of the conse-
quences of that event, which i_ncluded 1j.ncoln's procla-
mation of a state oi' insur.rection and the mobilization of 
1411ickett :h1pers, Dispatch No. 2, Yancey, host and .Nann 
to Toombs, June 1, 1861. 
15rickett L'apers, lJispa. tch .ifo. 1, Toombs to Yancey, 
Ro;;;,t and Mann, April 4, 1861. 
1611ickett i:apers, Di~putch No. 2, Toombs to Yancey, 
.rioBt and Hann, April 24, 1861. 
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Union troops. Toombs instructed the ministers "to 
assure all powers 11 that tne Confedei·acy would ta.ke all 
precautions in the ensuing conflict to insure the rights 
of commerce to all neut1al powers. Since Toombs' dis-
patch contained glowing reportu of new states --
Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansa~, 
and IV!iusouri -- which "manifested a determination" to resist 
the "unprovoked policy of aggression" of the government 
of Washington, it hardly comE::s as a surprise that he 
ordered the diplomats to read the entire dispatch to the 
ministers of foreign affairs to which they were accredited. 
To the information in Toombs' letter the commis-
sioners reported that Russell "manifested considerable 
interest." The Foreign 8ecretury assured. Yancey and Rost 
that the British government was anxious to communicate 
with the govt:.rnments of ·11ashington and Montgomery over 
the matters of the blockade, neutral rights and the ship-
ments of neutral goods in enemies' ships. Yet, as before, 
H.ussell declined to offer any guarantees concerning the 
recognition of Confederate independence. He merely re-
i ten.;.. ted his earlier statementt:> that the matter or recogni-
tion would be considered by the British Cabinet, and that 
no pledges, one way or the other, could presently be given.17 
1711ickett l'upers, Dispatch No. 2, Y~tncey, Rost and 
f'iann to Toombs, June 1, 1861. 
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Russell's position prompted the commissioners 
to report "t.tiat the British Cabinet here have no settled 
policy as to the recognition of our Government. 0 18 l.iather, 
the Confederate observed, ~ngland will continue to 
postpone a decision of l"ecogni tion until "some decided 
aci.vantage" is gained by the Confec.erate St.(;;.tee, or until 
"the nccH>Si ty for hu.ving cotton becomes pre:.;sing. 11 19 
They concluded that despite governmental inaction public 
journals and opinion "have been growing more i'avorable to 
our cuuse. 1120 Yet, for the second time in a week, the 
commissioners failed to evoke rmy assurances from 
Russell beyond the cursory guarantees to respect the 
rights 01' a uelligerent. Russell listened to the Con-
federa1;e plea "with all the polite attention and r·igid 
reserve" which characterized the English statesmen of 
t.hat era. 21 To not the slightest degree did he commit 
his government. 
After the interviews with Lord Russell, Pierre 
Host repaired to Paris w.nere he obtained an interview 
18}ickett Papers, Dispatch No. 2, Yu.ncey, ltost and 
Mann to Toombs, June 1, 1861. 
19Illi_. 
201..2i£. 
21Hendrick, Statesmen of ~ Cause, 143. 
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with Count ae ~orney, the half-brother and intimate ad-
visor to Emperor Napoleon III. 22 .ltost found that the 
various French political parties prevented a firm com-
mitment of the Emperor's governmsnt beyond the staid 
guarantees of the British. He reported that the Im-
periali5ts were "not averse to see a division of the 
Unite::d Stateu," but that the REd Republicans and the 
Orleanists uaw in the Union's dissolution the elirnina-
tion of a naval counterpoil:le to that of Great Britain.23 
Despite this very definite oppo:.:;ition by two of France's 
leading political factions against the bouthern secession, 
Ro::st concluded that "the O.f:.iinions of the French people 
and of the government ••• are considered to be quite 
favorable to our cause. 1124 
It seems that Rost, in discovering no immediate 
uni'riendliness on the part of the Emperor towards the 
Confederacy, expanded the attitude of the monarch to 
completely reflect the sentiments of the nation. In 
so doing, the commissioner again abandoned t.he c.iuality of 
objectivity so necessary to his mission. .Hardly a month 
had passed ~ince the douthern diplomats arrived in 1'urope. 
22Du Bose, Yancey, 60?. 
23:.r:ickett Tapers, Dispatch No. 2, Yanc:ey, Robt and 
r~mnn to Toombu, June 1, 18Gl. 
24 Ibid. 
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Yet in that short time, through the limitea establishment 
of con~acts with individuals who avowedly professed 
strong uentiments for the ;;..-iouth, ana through the bom-
bastic generalization of attitudes which could at best 
be described as sympathetic, the agents erroneously 
created the image of a compassionate Europe which only 
awaiteO. some sign of Southern stdbility before its full 
endorsement and support of Confederate independence. 
The final scene in the Confederates' first act 
in Europe was played out in the House of Commons. On 
June 7, Gregory introduced a motion that the independence 
of the Confederate l::itate:s be recognized by England.25 
Yet, pressured by Russell and the commercial parties of 
Manchet.>ter, Liverpool, and other industrial centers 
which feared an immedia:te alienation with the United 
States, the moticn was promptly withdrawn. 26 
The Confederate com.missioners noted "that the 
consideration of thf: motion gave rise to debate in which 
great acerbity would be manifested." Such debate would 
tend to forrn opposing parties, which, in turn, would 
prevent the British government "from acting impartially 
when the proper moment for action should arise." As to 
25.Pickett ?ape1 s, Yancey, J\ost and Mann to Toombs, 
June 10, 1861. 
26~. 
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just w.l'H;n the "proper moment" should occur, the Southern 
diplomu.tu agreed that :b:ngland would decide that for 
herself when either the Union or the Confederacy "shall 
prove strongest." In the rn<::antime, the envoys noted that 
both England and France would pursue the same policy of 
observing strict neutrality until the South demonstrated 
"sufficient consistency" in its internal affairs to 
justify recognition. 27 
During the two meetings of the Confederate 
commissioners with Russell anu the first Parliamentary 
debate over recognition, United States counter-diplomacy, 
under the direction of ~ecretary of State Seward, swung 
into action. On May 13, the day the joint British and 
French Neutrality Proclamation was issued, Seward's new 
appointee as Ambassador to Great Britain, Charles 
Francis Adams, arrived in London.28 Scarcely one week 
later, on May 21, Seward dispatched his diplomatic 
instructions to the minister. 29 
Basically, these instructions reflected the 
27Pickett .Papers, Yancey, Rost anu Mann to Toombs, 
June 10, 1861. 
28Henry W. Temple, "Wi lli1:i!li H. ::>ewa1d, " in 8amue 1 
Flagg Bemis, Editor, The Americar,: ~ecretaries .Qf State and 
'£heir :Diplomacy: (17 vO!S., New York: 1927), VII, 52. 
29Ibid., 52. 
indignation endured on the pa1·t of the United States 
government through the reception -- however informal 
55 
of the Confederate commissioners by Great Britain. In 
his notorious Dispatch No. 10, which Lincoln drastically 
modified on account of the original harshness of tone 
and explici tne!.:ls of content, Sewar·d ordered. Adams to 
protest vehemently to the British government for their 
prem<.:.ture actions and declarations.30 Since, Seward 
reasoned, the unofficial meetings between the British 
Foreign Office and the Southern envoys were "useless 
and meaningless, 11 ,they snould immediately be discon-
tinued.. If not, the Secretc..r;y of State instructed Adams 
to 11 desist from all intercourse, unofficial as well as 
official," with the British government.31 
Despite Lincoln's amenuments to the dispatch, 
::>eward'e.communic8.tion came dangerously close to being 
an ultimatum. In the hands of a lesser diplomat, they 
could easily have been construed as such. dince they 
threatened th£: total severence of diplomatic relations, 
the inLltructions required a clever and tactful presenta-
tion. It is to the lasting credit of Adams that .he was 
30Hendrick, Lincoln'..§ 'iJur (;µb.j.ne1. (.Boston, 1946), 
195-1~6. 
)li;epurtment of .itu.te, Diplomatic Gorret:>t-:ondence of 
the United Stateo: J~apt::1':.:> 11.ela.ting lQ. ]1oreign Affairs, 
1861-1862 (W::.i.si1ington, .u.C.: 18b2), ~eward to Auam::;, 
JUii'e 21, 1861, ~0-96. 
56 
able to deliver these instr-uctions with directness with-
out provoking Britain into :::mother Anglo-American conflict. 
Adams presented his instructions to Russell in a 
most thorough and courteous fashion, which "completely 
disarmed the ~1oreign Secretary. u32 Russell replied 
that there was nothing unprecedented in receiving ouch 
envoys unofficially, as it served to provide desired 
information in a most satisfactory and convenient way.33 
Concerning the Confederate delegation, Russell admitted 
tha.t he had already met with them twice, though on 
informal terms, ana that "he had no intention of seeing 
them any more. 11 34 Although not a positive pledge, the 
statement of Russell's intentions served Adams with a 
major diplomatic triumph. He oucceeded in thoroughly 
frustrating th~ Confederates' attempts to continue 
direct negotiations with the ~nglish Foreign Office, and, 
as such, succe~rnf'ully removed bl.llother opportunity for 
:::>outhern initiative. 
The first efforts by the Confederate envoys to 
achieve an immediate and enthusiastic recognition of 
32Temple, "3eward," 198. 
33nepartment of State, Diplomatic Cor·respondence, Adan.s 
to Seward, June 14, 1861, 104. 
34rbid. 
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independence had failed. Despite the guarded optimism of 
the Southern lobby and the bouyant naivete' of the 
Confederate ministers themselves, hostile factors were 
quickly arising to frustrate Confederate diplomacy. 
The uncommitted aloofness of Russell, the unsatisfac-
tory debates in Parliament, and the effective counter-
diplomacy of Adams developed to thwart and contain the 
initial Confederate labors. As the summer months 
approached, thC> comrnissione1s contenteci themselves with 
~preading Southern propaganda and laying plans for their 
next concerted effort to win recognition. 
CHAPTER IV 
CON.frl:JJERA~l.1E PJ:WPAGANDA -- A NEGATIVE A:PPROACH 
Through June and July of 1861, the Confederate 
commissioners concentrated their propaganda efforts in 
repudiating the effectiveness, and hence, legality of 
the Union blockade, and in arousing public sentiment 
against the anticipated cotton famine. ~ince they had 
been excluded from any further interviews with Russell 
on account of the effective diplomacy of ~eward and 
Ada.ms, they sought a circulation of their views through 
pe1sonal contacts with various political leaders, news-
paper reporters and editors. 
Mann soon reported that he ha.d held two favorable 
interviews wi t.tl .Paul J. Reuter, the head of the Reuter 
Telegraph and News Agency of kondon. 1 In acknowledging 
Heuter's virtual control of the telegraph lines in London 
and the news services to the Continent, Mann indicated 
the enormous benefit to the Confederacy if an agreement 
could be reached whereby news would be transmitted directly 
from the :Jouth to Britain. 2 l'reviously, war news from 
lOwBley, King Cotton, 62. 
2 l'ickett .Pa_per::i, .Mann to Toombs, August 3, 1861. 
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the United ~tates to Europe came through formal communi-
cations agencies and their dispatches from New York or Bos-
ton harbor. Since these two northern cities were cur-
rently bastions of strength in the Union camp, the news 
that left these ports was obviously tinted to reflect 
Northern sentiments. 
The commissioner informed Toombs that Reuter 
"is not only willing but anxious to furnish his cor-
respondents .•• with the latest intelligence from both 
sides. 11 3 Mann further reporteu that he and .Heuter had 
agreed upon a plan for delivering the news, in code, to 
a neutral party in Ireland wno would then forward the 
entire communication to both the Reuter agency and the 
Confederate commissioners.4 Such a plan if put into 
operation, noted Mann, could effectively counteract the 
preponderance of propanganaa which is "furnished in the 
North for dissimination on this side of the Atlantic. 11 5 
Despite the Confederate government's failure to 
employ the specific recommendations of Commissioner Mann, 
His, Yancey's, and host's sporadic admissions that the 
0outhern propaganda prog1au1 suffered. from lack of exposure 
)}ickett 1,apers, Mann to 'l'oombs, August 3, 1861. 
4~. 
5r- · d l) l. • 
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prompted later improvements along these lines. As 
already noted, with the appointment of Henry Hotze in 
November, 1861, Confederate propaganda entered a more 
or·ganized, influential, and financially stable period. 6 
The inability of' the diplomatic mission of Yancey, Rost, 
and hunn to effectively establish a formal information 
agency in l!;urope demonstrated the E>hort-sightedness of the 
Confederate effort. oubsequent Southern labors in E'urope 
attempted to overcome this inadequacy. Under Hotze, 
De Leon, and others, the propaganda work begun by the 
first envoys of the cotton kingdom and the native Southern 
lobbyists developed into a cohesive system which sought to 
counteract the Northern publicity campaigns. 
The approach to propaganda activities which the 
initial Confederate commission assumed was a curious 
blend of inconsistency ana inaction. On one hand, as 
the Mann dispatch indicates, the ministers pressed for a 
more active and persuasive propaganda policy. Yet, in 
reality, the course they actually pursued reflected the 
patterns of quiescence which their instructions, British 
policy, and Union diplomacy produced. 
In their second aispatch to Toombs, the Southern 
envoys reported th~t the obstreperous attempts by the 
Union.ist advocates to influence public opinion had met 
6
see Chapter 11 I, pages 44-45. 
with little succe~rn. 7 Rather, "the effect ha;;; been most 
decidedly tu injui·e that cause and to incite British an-
tagoniurn.11h dince the commit.isioners noted that this 
unfavorable reaction "has been so definitely the case," 
they inf orrued the i::ltate Department that they would 
profit more from a policy of reserve than from one of 
teme!'ity.9 .LJesiring that tne publicity errors of the 
J~ortr1 suould "have full ef'f'ect on the public mind," 
the Goni'ea.erates themselves ueclineu from any active 
~ublic movements so as not tu uivert attention from 
tue Union propagandists. 10 As to the success of their 
approach, the envoys expre~sed satisfaction that their 
course of action "has met WJ.th eminent success. 11 11 
It is indeed dil'ficu.tt to see 1-he "eminent 
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success" wiiich T,he current Con1'ederate propaganda program 
generated. It is even harder to imagine a continuation 
oi' tnis policy oi' limited pub.tici ty with any hopes of 
gathering :;;upport. Yet, in the following weeks, the 
?Pickett l:'apera, Dispatch No. 2, Yancey, host and Mann 
to Toombs, July 15, 1861. 
8 roia. 
91- . ' OlLl .• 
lOioickett l-apers, .Dispatch 1o. 3, Yancey and Mann to 
Toombs, July 15, 1861. 
11~. 
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Confederate commi~sioners reported that the irritable 
tactics of the Northern sympathizers had not only brought 
Britain to the point where a significant Southern 
mili-r;ary victory could instigate .recognition, 12 but 
also thut the anti-slavery sentiment, which existed 
predominantly in Hnglana at the outBet of the war, hau 
diBsipateci to a negligible factor. 13 At least in the 
eyes of the rniniute1s, the negative propa~anda of the 
;:)outh portendeu a diplomatic: triumph. 
What ap:pea.rs to bt:: a paradoxical t:iituation --
reports of inc.rea.uing Confeuerate popular support despite 
an acknowledged paucity of ~outhern propaganda effort --
represents in reality a case which conforms q_uite easily 
to the patterne already estG.blished by the commission. 
The Confederates, as in t.r~eir dealings with Russell, 
were less con-cent to follow this propaganda approach 
a~> they were restricted to it. Their own inabilities 
and their State 1Jepartment's inadequate provisions for 
an active propaganda agency certainly serve as more 
plausible ex:planations for the Confederate actions than 
t.t;.e casual uismist>al oJ t!rn necessity 01' such an agency 
12
.r:ickett J:lap8rs, Yuncey and Rost to Toomb:;,, June 10 
1861; .lJiepatch 1~0. 3, Yancey <:mu N<:mn to '.1.'oombu, July lS, 
1861. 
lj 
:Pickett :tape1s, Disputch No. 4, Yancey and Nann to 
Toombs, August 1, 1861. 
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by the envoys themselves. Likewise, the optimistic 
statemen~s in the commission's dispatches exemplify 
the ministers' habit of grabbing at loose straws of 
encouragement. The commissioners tran::>.formed the 
patient non-committal utti tudes of Englund and 1!1rance 
into l:i glowing fa.voritit:im towards und enaorsement of 
~outhern secession. In advocating restraint, where 
there were no .:;.'H..ans for activity, a.no. in affirming 
support, where there only existed the practicality of 
.t;uropean .,b;Olitics, the commissioners created an illusion 
of contentment within their diplomatic confinement. 
Although the commi::rnione.rs pretenued satisfac-
tion in their restrictive t:om:nunications with Russell 
and with their limited publicity effort:::i in England, they 
~;till continued active negotiations with high governmen-
tal officials in 1'1rance. In mid-July, Hoot obtained an 
interview with ~doard Thouvenal, the French Minister 
for JPoreign Af'fair:.:;. l4 In familiar tE:rms, Thou venal 
assured Rost thL.:lt Fnillee dusired to sec peuce re-
establiehed in America, and, that for the du.cation of 
the war, she woulu maintuin u strict neutrality. 15 
14t;ullahan, Diplomatic nl:.:.;tory Q!. <.:onfeueracy, 119. 
15i:·ickett .t'upers, .l.iispu.tch No. 3, Yancey and Mann to 
Toombs, July 15, lBbl. 
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Yancey soon followed Rost to Paris. Although he 
did not meet formally with either Thouvenal or De Morney, 
he nevertheless formed strong opinions as to the French 
position. In particular, Yancey felt that Napoleon 
regarded the French affairs in :burope "to be of more 
importance" than her relations with America. As such, 
the commissioner reasoned that ]franc e woula gladly leave 
any decision for Confederate recognition "in the hands 
of the British Cabinet," and that l!"rance would. continue 
to abide by "the current English policy. Yancey further 
reported that "reliable sources" from Spain, Belgium 
and Denmark assured the Confederates t.hut their govern-
ments entertained "the most friendly feeling" towards 
the ~outhern states .16 As with ]'ranee, though, these 
nations would only recognize Confederate independence 
when Great Britain determined to do so. 
Nearly four months after the appointment of their 
mission, the Southern delegates found that the original 
target for their diplomacy -- Great Britain -- remained 
more than ever the iocal point for any European diplo-
matic decisions. France, ;.)pain, Belgium and Denmark 
all in~icated a certain sy~pathy towards the Confederate 
cause; yet, they also refused to grant formal recognition 
161,ickett Papers, Dis1Jutch .No. 3, Yl.incey and Mann to 
Toombs, July 15,-1861. 
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without Englanct•s lead. After July, 1861, all three 
commissioners returned to London, where, for the duration 
of their appointment, they directeci their efforts ex-
clusively towards the Britis.n Foreign Office. 
Reunited in hngland, the Confederates intensi-
fied their attack against the legality of the Union 
blockade. Throulsh services of the Southern Job by, they 
managed to create substantial agitation in Parliament 
over two delicate point~ in the blockade matter.17 In 
the first place, the commissioners contended that the 
blockade was in violation of the 1856 Declaration of 
Paris.18 This Declaration, adopted by a European 
congress. meeting in Paris after the Crimean War, stated 
that blockades, in oruer to be binding, must be proven 
effective. More opecifically, a legal blockade must 
be maintained by forces sui'f icient enough "to prevent 
acce~s to the coast of' tne enemy. 1119 Through statistics 
of successful blockade violati0ns from the State Depart-
ment and private sourcef:.i, the uiploma"Ls readily supplied 
Gregory, Lindsay, and other lt,;ading lobbyists with evi-
dence for their arguments. 
170wsley, King Cotton, 62. 
18J?hilip ~Hern When the Guns Roared: ltforld Aspects of 
1h£. American Civii war "(1re'W Y"O'rk, 1965), 56-51. ~ 
19Fred L. Israel, Editor, ~ajor Peace Treaties of Modern 
Hi!:ltory, 1648-1967 ( 4 vols., New York: 1967), II, 957. 
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Concerning the Paris pact, the Confederates only 
argued one side of the issue. Although they persisted in 
condemning the Federal blockade, they conveniently ig-
nored another aspeut of tne Declaration -- that which 
outlawed privateering. Secretary of State ~eward, 
however, did not. He instructed Adams to enter into 
negotiations with England to seek a convention of mutual 
accedence to the document.20 The negotiations failed to 
elicit a:n agreement between the United States and 
Britain, though, when Russell declared that, in recog-
nizing the belligerent utatus of the Confederacy, he had 
elevated the rank of their naval vessels from illegal 
privateers to ·legitimate warships.21 The Foreign SecrA-
tary contendeo. that as long as the Union and Great Britain 
conflicted over the st~tus of the struggle in America, 
there would always exi:::;t the possibility of accusations 
of bad faith and of violations of the convention. 22 Despite 
the failure of these negotiations, the inclination of the 
United :>tates to uccede to the very pact which the Con-
federates claimea they violated substantially lessened 
the significance of the bouthern contentions. 
20a1yndon G. Van :.Ueusen, William Henry Sewa1d (New York, 
1'367), 294-295. 




Secondly, the Southern State Department and the 
commissioners felt that the blockade "exposed the United 
citates to the charge of contradictory diplomacy." 23 The 
United States treated the Uonfederacy as nothing more 
than rebellious subjects, yet the very exibtence of the 
blockade seemed to violate this approach. :3ince the 
Union "could hardly proclaim a blockade without declar-
ing itself a belligerent, 11 24 it appeared to the 
Southerners that the United States had inadvertently 
accorded the Confederate States, too, at least the infer-
mal ranking of a belligerent. 
Despite the Confederate accusations, the British 
Ministry continued to maintain the policy of neutrality 
whioh had been declared on May 13. 25 In recognizing 
the legality of the blockade in this declaration, the 
British policymakers perhaps overestimated the naval 
capabilities of the Union to effectively blockade a 
coast of over three thouaand miles. 26 Wevertheless, 
whether in exaggeration of American naval power or in 
ignorance of the geography of the Confederate coast, 
23Millard, "Foreign iolicy of Confederate States," 244. 
24Graebner, "Northern Diplomacy and .r...uropean Neutral-
ity," 55. 
25see Chapter III, paf.e 47. 
26Adams, Britain ~ ~ Civil ~' I, 95. 
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Britain acted in a conservative, sensible, and realistic 
manner. Similarly, Hnglish acknowledgment of Southern 
belligerency, though an action far short of initial 
Confederate expectations, reflected the pragmatism and 
realism of European politics. England's consistent 
positton was to view event::; patiently and to evaluate 
situations fully before making any total commitments. 
In their dispatches to Richmond, the ministers 
indicated a partial, yet confused, understanding of 
this pragmatic quality in European politics.27 More 
than once, they informed Toombs of their confidence in 
a forthcoming British and ~'rench recognition of the 
Confederacy, contingent upon the proven stability of the 
South as demonstrated through the military success of 
the ~outhern armies. In late Nay, they reported that 
favorable actions concerning recognition would be 
forthcoming from the major :t;uropean powers "upon the 
270n May 21, 1861, the .Provisional Congress of the 
Confederate ;;;tates voted to move the capital of the Con-
federacy from Nontgomery, Alabama, to ltic.hmond, Virginia.. 
The move was quickly cowpleteo: so that by the beginning 
of June, 1861, the Executive Departments were actively 
operating in their new seat. Davis lit.:1tee1 as .reasons for 
the move the fact that the union mili.tary efforts seemed 
to be directed against Virginia, and ''from no point could 
the necessary measures for her defense ana protection 
be eo efficiently protected aL> from her own capital." 
Davis, "Message to the Congress of the Coni'ederu.te States,'' 
July 20, 1861, in .h.ichardson, 1Vlessag8s ™ .l!apers of 
Confederacy, I, 117. 
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first deciaed success w.t1ich we may obtain. n28 On July 15, 
they wrote that "as soon as a favorable military event 
is officially announced" they would immediately demand 
official recognition of the Confederate government. 29 
Again, two weeks later, they announced. that the question 
of iecognition restea solely upon "military events in 
Virginia. 11 3° On July 21, 1861, the military event in 
Virginia which the commissioners alluded to occurred 
on the fields of Bull Run, and jubilation over this 
Confederate victory set the stage for the final climac-
tic act of the Yancey-Rost-Mann mj.ssion. 
28JJickett Papers, Dispatch No. 1, Yancey, Rost and 
M~ to Toombs, Nay 21, 1861. 
29 
Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 3, Yancey and Mann to 
Toombs, July 15, 1861. 
30Pickett .Papers, Dispatch No. 4, Y1:incey and :Mann to 
Toombs, August 1, 1861. 
CliAJ?TEii. V 
Trlli SOUTH DEMANDS IlliCOGNITION 
On July 29, 1861, Robert :N. T. Hunter, who had 
recently replaced ToollibS as the Confederate decretary 
of :;)tate,l informed the commissioners of the "glorious 
victory" of the Uouthern armies over the Union forces 
at Manassas, Virginia. Hunter enthusiastically reported 
that the United 8tates "was completely routed, with a 
loss of 15,000 in killed, wounded, or missing" out of 
an attacking force estima1.ed at 60,000 men. .E'urther-
more, the Confederate forceLJ, under the command of Gen-
erals Pierre G. T. Bueregard and Joseph ~. Johnston, 
had captureu all the artillery, ammunition and provi-
sions of the enemy, "together with 2,500 prisoners, 
several rtgirnental stano.ards, and a flag of the 
1Toombs resigned his post as Secretary of State on 
July 21, 1861. Disgruntled from the beginning with 
Davis' foreign policy, Toombs chose retirement from the 
1'resident 's Cabinet after the initial ventures of' Con-
federate diplomacy had rei..iJ.ized no success. His replace-
ment, Hunter, was a. close acq_uainta.nce of Di:l.vis, and, in 
fact, had been Virginia's Livorite son c8.ndidate i'or the 
Presidency of the Ooni'ederate otates. Since Davis had 
recently moved the capiLal to Virginia, the u.ppointment 
oi' Hunter wau seen as an attempt to "recognize" Virginia 
in the CCJ.binet. Hendrick, ;Jtutesmen of Lost Cause, 
151, 185. 
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United States. 11 2 
Embellishing his account with nwnerous references 
to the complete defeat of "the picked corps of the 
.Hegular Army of the United States, 11 Hunter emphasized 
"the universal joy" of the people of the Confederacy at 
the decisive victory. The oecretary reported revitali-
zation of the Southern spirit in a "renewed courage and 
valor." He announced that the victory "has removed the 
fears of the timid" and that it has proven beyond a 
doubt "that the Confederate dtates can and will maintain 
their independence and successfully resist the efforts 
of thG United St.ates ••• to compel them •.• to a political 
union with the North. 11 3 
:Before this dispatch reached the commissioners, 
however, New York and Lor.i.ucn papers had announced the 
striking news.4 William li. Russell, sent to America as 
war correspondent for the London Times, reported the 
results of the battle in descriptions so uncomplimentary 
to the Union that Britiohers of both i;ro and anti-Southern 
leanings regarded "the Northern effort as doomed to failure."5 
2Pickett Fapers, Dispatch No. 7, Hunter to Yancey, Rost 
and Mann, July 29, 1861. 
3rbid. 
40wsley, King Cotton, 64. 
5Adams, Britain !ID.Q_ the Civil ~' I, 177-178. 
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Encouraged by William Russell's accounts of a half-crazed 
and disheveled mob which had retreated in panic to 
Washington before the guns of the Confederate armies, the 
commissioners decided that the time was ripe for some 
definitive action. In an earlier dispatch to the otate 
Department, the Southerners had expressed their intent 
to present a formal demand for recognition upon the 
first official reports of a Uouthern military triumph.6 
The victory at Bull Run and the subse~uent strengthening 
of the Southern position in London demanded that the 
envoys abandon their complacency and assume some initia-
tive. 
The report of the victory at Bull Run seemed 
also to have arrived at a mo~t salutary time for the 
good of the commission itself. Within the commission 
seeds of discontent from previous failures to achieve a 
creditable diplomatic success had divided the ministers 
ovc;r certain procedural matters. In debating on a course 
of action to be followed in the event that the British 
Government still refused to receive them officially and 
to recognize Uonfederate independence, the envoys found 
themselves at odds with each other.7 Rost und Mann 
6Jee (.;hapter IV, page 69. .l:'ickett l:'apers, Dispu.tch 
No. 3, Yancey and Hann to '.i1oombs, July 15, 1861. 
7?ickett }apers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and Mann 
to Hunter, Augu8t 5, 1861. 
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advised to "refrain from urging a decision" from Great 
Britain "until a change of opinion is effected. 11 8 Yancey, 
either in awareness of the mechanics of British policy 
or in acknowledgment of the failure of the mission, 
suggested that the envoys resign their posts in London 
and "proceed to other Governments and make the t1ame demand 
or ask for a recall."9 Locked in this impasse, the 
commissioners had referred the matter to Richmond for 
settlement when the news of Bull Run arrived. Thus, the 
Confederate victory at Manassas fortuitously serv~d to 
sustain the unity of spirit within the commission as it 
focused attention again on a singular objective. 
In the same letter "to Hunter which revealed 
tlie open dissension among the commissioners, the diplo-
mats expounded on anoth(;r area of discontent wilich af-
f ected the mission as a whole. The envoys deeply resented 
the thorough snubbing, both socially and officially, they 
had received from the british Ministry. They reported 
that tney had "not received the least notice or attention 
from any member of the Government since ••• (thei.r) arrival 
in .Englana." Although they graciously announced that 
8iickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and. Mann 
to Hunter, August 5, 1861. 
9ill£.. 
this fact was mentioned "in no spiri.t of' complaint," 
they nevertheless advised President Davis to consider 
such British actions "in weighing the conduct of this 
Government toward the Confederate Statea. 11 10 With the 
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Southern victory at Bull Run, though, there seemed to be 
no reason to doubt that the policy of uncivility would 
soon be reversed. 
In order to capitalize on the emotionaliem of 
the moment, the commissione.rs immediately dispatched a 
note to Russell urgently requesting a 1'ormal interview.11 
The Foreign Secretary, having repaired to one of his coun-
try residences, delayed hio re,!.Jly for sever·al days. When 
it arrived, however, it substantially erased the optimis-
tic spirit which had engulfed the envoys since the ini-
tial reports of First Manassas. Addressed from his 
country estate, .l:'embroke Lodge, the rejoinder neither 
bore an official letterhead nor identified Earl .Russell 
in any manner distinct from that of a private citizen.12 
Hedundant in informality, "the almost studied insult" 
lO:Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Host and Mann 
to Hunter, August 5, 1861. 
11:Philip Stern, ~ the Guns Roared: World Aspects 
of~ American Civil~ (New York, 1965), 7'5. 
12Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and Mann 
to Hunter, :\ugu.st 5, 1861. 
13 
of the reply cer·tainly injured the Confeuerates' pride. 
Nore than the format of the letter, Russell's 
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curt reply fully aemonstrated the British resolve to 
develop a policy uevoid of futile pressures of Confederate 
diplomacy. "I:;arl .H.ussell presents his compliments," 
wrote the Foreign ~.:)ecretary, "anci would. be obliged to 
them ( commission.ers) if tney would put in writing any 
communications they wish to muke to him. 11 14 Nothing 
more. In this brief exchange, Russell virtually solid-
ified his earlier promises to Adams to ref rain from any 
interviews with the tiouthern agents,15 He comvletely dis-
armed the Confederate representatives, and, once again, 
frustrated their initiative. 
Their }Jlan of action restricted to only one 
possible course, the commissioners gathert:d in London to 
prepare th~ formal demand for recognition. On August 14, 
1861, they presented to Russell the latest declaration of 
the allegea rigllt of the Confeaeracy to recognition from 
the British government.16 At> ouch, it fully marked the 
13Henarick, bt~tesmen 2.£ ~ Cause, 151. 
l4l'ickett Papers, Russell to Yancey, Host and Mann, 
August 7 t 1861. 
15
see Uhapter III, page 56. 
16
:rickett Papers, Yancey, Host and Nurm to Bussell, 
Au_g. ust 14, 1861. The following paragruphs, pages 76 to 
8} :J.re based. on this demand for rec ogni ti on which the 
commissioners delivered to .ctussell. 
apex of their mi~oion in ~urope, and has since prompted 
Yancey's biographert John W. Du Bose, to comment that 
"upon the reasoning of this document, and its facts, 
the cause of the Confederate States will stand at the 
bar of history.nl7 
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The commissioners began their communication to 
Russell by reviewing the arguments for recognition which 
they had previously presented to him in the inf'ormal 
interviews of May 3 and 9. In urging the legality of 
secession as the spontaneous right of state sovereignty, 
thHy recalled for Ru1:lsell the proofs of population, 
productivity and area of the Confederate States which 
they had formerly used to prove that they represented 
neither pirates nor rebels. The envoys then proceeded 
to elaborate on the nece~sity of the agricultural South 
to resort to privateering. The delegates defended the 
Confederate issuance of letters of marque for privateer-
ing purposes as "legitimate objects and means of warfare." 
However, des11i te the ~outhern right to defend her inde-
pendence through this cont.ra.ctual mode of warfare, the 
diplomats charged that English laws of neutrality, which 
forbad "the entry o.f the lJUblic and private armed vessels 
of either party into Bri tis.h ports wi t1:1 prizes," operated 
l7~ of Yancey, 609. 
to the 11practical protP.ction" of United titates commerce 
and to the detriment of Confederate naval operations. 
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The commissioners continued with an unobtrusive 
explanation of their government's initial decision to 
offer re(luests rather than demands for recognition, 
while the proofs for the legitimacy of such action were 
being demonstrated in America. The commissioners then 
entered into a lengthy description of the power of the 
Confederate States. They strtrn.:ied that Lincoln's 
"aggressive policy" and "military despotism" had already 
caused the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee 
and Arkansas "to secede from the late Union" and join 
the Confederacy. Likewise, Maryland, Kentucky, and 
l"'lissouri, "agitated b;y the throes of revolution," were 
shortly ex:pected to follow suit. The Southern agents 
further reported that in Illinois and several other 
states, "public assemblies and ••• legislatures have 
condemned the war as subveruive to the Constitut~on." 
"::>triking evidences of ••• increased strength," termed 
the Confederates -- or, more accurar..ely, striking 
evidences of increased exa0gerationl 
Concerning the progreos of the war, the South-
erners dismissed as "grossly erroneous" the charges that 
the slaveholding states could no't suf;:itain a prolonged 
conflict with the North. Already, they reported, the 
Soutc1 had prevent~d the recu.ptuI·e b.v tho Union of a:ny 
single i'ortification ana had restricted the advance 
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of the Union armies to a mere five miles. Southern forces 
had captured "a mighty fortress on the Atlantic" (Fort 
Sumter) and had taken several forts along the western 
frontier. 1!1urthermore, the agents dismissed the Union 
blockade as completely ineffectual, except on the 
Chesapeake, and reported that Southern ships have sailed 
nout of every other port at which the attempt has been 
made." To further substantiute their arguments, the 
diplomats included an anotated extract from the United 
dtates census of 1850 which favorably compared the 
agricultural anci manuf'acturing productivity of the slave-
holding and free states. 
The letter to Russell is particularly signifi-
cant for it contains the first formal defense by the 
commissioners of the slavery system. Previously, the 
Confederates had only extended guarded and subtle refer-
ences to the peculiar institution.18 Now they openly 
combatted the anti-slavery sentiment of the English 
gov8rnment in a passionate, yet evasive. Plea. 
They indicated, in th~ first place, their aware-
ness that the British anti-slavery sentiment had prevented 
1°see Chapter II, footnote No. 32. J:!ickett }apers, 
Toombs to Yancey, Rost anu JYlann, March 16, 1861. 
the formation of friendly relations with the Confederate 
government. However, they contended that the system was 
not uniquely Southern, but in fact, had been established 
by the "authors of the Declaration of the Independence" 
Englishmen. "Those great and good men" succeeded in 
putting into operation a plan of government which rested 
"upon the great and recognized di~;tinction between the 
white and bli.:ick man." As to thE: wisdom of that course, 
the commissioners refused to pt:1.ss judgment. 
Moreover, the agents argued that the United 
States had prosecuted war for the sole purpose of main-
taining the Constitution and preserving the Union. 
"It was from no fear that the slaves would be liberated 
that becession took place." The envoys stressed that 
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"the very party in power has prepared to guarantee slavery 
forever in the i::>tates if the South would remain in the 
Union." Thus, the anti-slavery elements in Britain, 
reasoned the diplomats, "can have no ~ympathy with the 
North ••• (who) with a canting hypocrisy ••• would 
enlist those symyathies on false pretenses." 
Returning to the military operations of the war, 
they reminded Rusuell of "the great battle of Bull Run," 
where "the .b't::deralists were defeuted and driven from 
tht: field in open flight." '.1.'he envoys reported that the 
Goni'ederacy hati rt:cently mounted offensives of their 
own. These operations, noteu the commissioners, are so 
succef:;Jsful that the government in Washington has resigned 
itself solely to the defense of its capital and the 
preservation of "the remnant of its defeated and disor-
ganized forces." 
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The final matter which the commissioners discussed 
in their definitive defense of the Confede,ru.te position 
concerned the cotton crop. 1r.hey reminded the Foreign 
Secretary that the "cotton-picking season had already 
commenced" in the South. As an inducement to British 
commercial interests to break the blockade, the diplo-
mats announced that the cotton would not only be prohi-
bited from Southern wharves and ports until the blockade 
shall be raised, but that an embargo has been placed on 
the cotton for the ostensive purpose of preventing its 
shipment inland through the United Btates.19 In order 
19The cotton embargo plan, proposing to compel Britain 
to seek cotton on ~outherri shores and to prevent the United 
~tatcs from obtaining any quantities of' the stuple crop, 
was a natural extension of the Davis "cotton famine" policy. 
Carried to its extreme, the embargo att8mpted to hasten 
the anticipated cotton famine in EurOJ)e through willful 
destruction of vast stores of cotton and through legis-
lation preventing cultivation of the fiber. ~Lis contro-
versial amendment to the original Davie }.ilan further 
alienated the foreign policy factions. Yancey, faced 
with the dilemma o:f defending a policy which he definitely 
opposed, yielded to the: optimistic spirit of the moment --
a concession which the continua.no e of' his ap1Jointment 
dictated. See Daniel, The Richmond Examiner During the 
·~mr, 43, for a summary OT"" views on the embargo by leaders 
of the navis and Rhett-Toombs factions. 
to obtain cotton, ths agents stated that "it must be 
sought for in the Atlantic and Gulf ports" of the 
~outhern states by vessels of the British merchant 
mdrine .. 
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Yancey, Rost and Mann completed their communica-
tion to Ru:sse 11 with an intensive appeal that ·the Bri-
tish government extend de facto .recognition to the 
Confederate States. They expressed incredulity in that 
recognition had not already been granted. Yet, they 
displayed confidence that hu~sell, having realized the 
necessity for the establiuhment of commercial relations, 
woula "take into c0nsid.er'-ltion 11 their arguments and 
immediately grant a i-orrnal acknowledgment of Confederate 
sovereignty. 
In its entirety, the Yancey-Host-Mann demand for 
recognition, ali;hough the most ue.t'initive diplomatic 
announcement of the Confeueracy, ielied wholly on the 
already familiar urgumenttJ for recognition. In summary 
fashion, the diplomats recounted the }.Jrinciples for 
secession, the evidences of stability, and the rights 
to recognition which .hau long characterized· the oouthern 
case. Yet, in its thoroughness, the letter elaborated 
on certain postulates which merit ftirther comment. 
In particular, the Confederate invitation to 
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the British to willingly violute the legally instituted 
blockade of the United Stat8s clearly courted a declara-
tion of war between the two powers. It was an invitation 
wholly based on the basic contentions of "king cotton" 
philosophy. The Confederates gambled that the promise 
of vc;.st stores of cotton on the Southern shores, and the 
pressures ot' an anticipated cotton famine in England would 
surely motivate the British to procure the staple. Al-
t.t1ough their alternative solutions indicated only a 
partial understanding 01· the 1·actoru which prevented 
.brJti~h acquiescence to the Southern plan, .Rhett, Toombs, 
and Yancey had recogni~ea and forewarned the fallacy of 
the gamble. 
On the matter of the blockaa.e. the commissioners 
presentea a confusing ana contraaictory picture. On one 
hand, they argued that the blockade only enjoyed success 
on the Chesapeake and was everywhere else as much non-
existent ae ineffective. Yet, they curiously reported 
that the Confederacy would continue to w.i thhold its cotton 
until the blockaae wus proven inoperative. It seems 
the com:nissionero either placed an extravagant value on 
the commercial worth of the Chesapeake or neglected to 
disclocse the full ef'fectiveneos and scope of the blockade. 
In view of the other egregiouu tJtatement8 within their 
presentation, the contentioub blockade accounts reflect 
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more than anything the desperation of the Confederate 
agents to employ bombastic -- almost ludicrous -- arguments 
to salvage a diplomatic victory. 
The commissioners did not have to wait long for 
Hwrnell 'o reply. On August 24, in a note addressed to 
the representutives of the ''so-styled Confederate .Gtates 
of North America," he curtly acknowledged their communi-
cation. He firmly reiterated the British intention to 
strictly adhere to its declared policy of neutrality. 
The British government, l:lu::>sell explained, "cannot under-
tuke tu determine by anticipation whut may be the issue 
oi' the contest." Furthermore, the Foreign Secretary 
unequivocally declared that a British recognition of 
Confederate inde1)endence would not be forthcoming until 
"the fortune of arms or the more peaceful mode of nego-
tiation'' should better determine the respective positions 
of' the two belligerents.20 
There can be no doubt as to the disheartening and 
defeatist reception of Russell's letter by both the 
ministers antl the State Department as revealed in the 
immediate conseY,.uences of the event. On August 24, the 
very day on wuich .husse11 had i·epliea. to the Confederate 
20lickett h:i.per s, Hus~>ell to Yancey, Host e .. nd hann, 
Augw.;t 24, 1861. 
84 
agents, nunter instruc~ed them ~o proceed to Madrid where 
they were to present their ca::rn before 0pain and ask for 
recognition. 21 Obviously, the communications systems 
of the mid-nineteenth century prevented such an immediate 
rl'sponse to the cormnissioners' rejection. Rather, 
Hunter's dispatch definitely indicated that the decision 
to .redirect the Confederate aiplomatic operations in 
Europe had already been made before the formal demand 
for recognition. Russell's reply only substantiated 
this decision. 
In early oeptember, Yancey, disgusted by the 
British .Ministry, the new instructions, and his strained 
relationship -wi t!1 Rost and Narm, intimated his desire to 
resign from the commission. 22 Ironically, like almost 
every other aspect of the Confederate miirnion to :Europe, 
even this decision was not left for Yancey to determine. 
On ~e1Jtember 23, Hunter informed the commissioners that 
the J:'rcniden t, with Congre~;sional approval, had aecided 
to disbanci the comrnission. 23 
It seems that Davis had finally realized that 
21Fickett l'apers, Dispatch No. 9, Hunter to Yancey, 
Rost and Mann, August 24, 1861. 
22 
Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 10, Hunter to Yancey, 
Ueptember 23, 1861. 
23_Pickett 1iaperu, Dispatch No. 11, hunter to Mann, 
0eptembEH' 2), 1861. 
the wait for recogniti.on would be a little longer than 
originally anticipated. The dispatch to Mann revealed 
that, in acknowledgment of this diplomatic fact of 
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life, permanent, resident, Confederate representatives in 
major European capitals would replace the roving ambassador-
ship of the Yancey-.Host-Munn commission. Mann, himself,. 
was instructed to assume the diplomatic position in 
Belgium, while the other coillillissioners, until the arrival 
of James M. Mason in England and John Slidell in l!'rance, 
would continue to function in a reportive and advisory 
capacity. 24 
From October to December, 1861, the commissioners 
occupied them~rnl ves in excursions between London and Paris 
in attempts to gauge popular and governmental attitudes. 
Yet, what appeared to be an insignificant and purely 
routine end to their mission shortly transformed into a 
period of signal enthusiasm and optimism. The moralistic 
case for Confederate recognition had repeatedly failed to 
evoke any encouraging reBJ-,orwe from Britain. But on 
.November 8, 1861, all ideali::rtic anu abstract arguments 
were forgotten in the verJ rbal and flu.grant violation of 
Br.i tish neutraJ rights wi tll the capture of the English 
steamship, 'J.'rent, by naval forces of the United Gtates. 
24 Pickett l'apu·s, lJispu tch No. 11, Hunter to Mann, 
~eptember 23, 1861. 
C1iA.l-'TEh VI 
A LAJT HOfE -- THE 11.tlliNT Ai'FAIH 
The routinism which characterized. the activities 
of the commiusionerb in the ~eriod between the initiul 
notice of their mission's dissolvement anu. tne formal re-
lease from their auties was abruptly shattered with the 
news of the Trent affair. Maeon and Slidell, the Confect-
erate commissioners aljpointed to replace the Yancey-Rost-
Mann mission, had boarded the British merchant vessel, 
~t, in Havana, and were proceeding on their voyage to 
Lone.on. On No.ven1ber 8, 1861, the ~Prent was hailed and 
boarded in the Bahama Channel near Havana by Unitea 
~tutes naval forces under the command of Captain John 
Wilkes of the Union gunboat, ~an Jacinto. \dlkes ordered 
the Confederate diplomats forcibly removed from the decks 
of the Trent and placea unuer arrest.l Scarcely two weeks 
I 
later "the news of the incid.l,;nt reacheu l!;n.gland and ignited 
the mo~t vociferous reaction :.:.tgainst United Jt21tes war 
111hi~ brief summary of event8 surrounding the seizure 
of tne Trent is taken .from the pt?ruonal account oi' the 
incident by JCJ.mes N. Ma.son. i:Jee, Mai.on, "Account of the 
Trent J~xperionce," in Virginia Mi:u.;on, · .c;ui tor, The .Public 
l:!lli. ™Diplomatic Corrt:sponaence of J'..ime8 M.Mason ~ 
bome .t'ersonul History ~ his lJaughter (Roanoke, Va...: 
'I9Q"5), 208-254. ~ 
policies in the entire conflict. 
The general resentment at the Union action fo-
cusea on two points: freedom of the seas for neutrals and 
the right to grant asylum. Concerning these two issues, 
the unofficial reaction of the English press and govern-
mental oJficials was one of righteous indignation. The 
event provided thereafter a willing audience for propa-
gandfa tactics of Southern lobbyists. Yet, Southern sym-
pathizers hardly had to circulate passionate condemnations 
of the seizure, for the mere factual reports of the inci-
aent createci its ov1n propaganda bonanza. 
Tile British press immediately commenced ec!itorial 
attacks on the Northern action. Leti by strong leader-
WJ.iting of the London Times, ~·~Herald, and .Punch, 
.c.nglish columnists censureci the North ati representatives 
of "insolence and uefiance of almost every diplomatic con-
ventionality. 112 They pictured Seward au a "reckless ad-
venturer," who, with Lincoln, would compel Britain to 
rt:linguish her neutrality, "an<.1 by that means bring on a 
European war."3 Likewise, British privatE.: citizens joined 
in a critical chorus against the seizure. .Bven so staunch 
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an advocate of the Union cau:.;e as Henry ~idgewick e.xclaimed: 
2Jor(1an, Buro.Pe ,rn .!h£_ 
)ill..£., 29. 
Civil War, 29-jl. 
-
"If ~l;\•aru wants a wur with .c.ngluna., he must huve it. 11 4 
i·rominent British ci tizl:ne l~latthew Arnold, ;Jir George 
Cornewall .Lewis, and ;::iir John Acton similarly voiced 
indign8. ti on at the AmE:r·ic&n challenge to British rights 
as a neutral. Henry Adums, son of tne Uniteu ~tates 
ambassaa.or to Great Britain, vi1a.rned of prt:valent British 
SE:ntiments in a letter from .London: "This nation means 
war. Do not doubt it. 115 
Vi.hen the Trent finu.lly arrived in England, it 
carried not only news of the capture but also the papers 
and instr·uctions wnich the Gunl.'eaeru.te Stute DeJ.ia1·tment 
.haa deli verea to J11auon Lilla. Slidell. 6 These were promptly 
forwu.rued to Yancey, host tlnu Mann in London. The South-
ern envoys hau already delivered to the British government 
"a solemn remon:.>trance against the outrage perpetrated 
by the United States" when these papers arriveu..7 Now, 
suppliea with fresh instructions and information, al-
tnough all i;he mo.t8riul haC. originally been intended for 
the use of Mason and t>lia.ell, the commissioners sent a 
4Jordan, Euro1;e ~ t.he Civil ~, 29. 
5Bailey, Diplomatic History of Arnericun Peo;.,le, )29. 
6:tiickett Papers, Dispatch No. 10, Yancey, Rost and 




second note of protest to Russell.a 
The dispatched delivered by the Trent contained, 
in paI·ticular, statistical accounts of successful block-
ade violations from April 29 to Au.gust 20. This infor-
mation constituted the bulk of tne diplomats' communi-
cation. 2.'hey insisted that the blockade was merely a 
"paper" one, as clearly demonstrated by the fact that "more 
than four hundred vessels huve arrivea and departed. un-
molested." As such, the Union bloukade definitely vio-
latca cri ter·ia for blockades establif>hed i.n the Declar-
a ti on of 1:-'aris. The c o.u.uniseioners challenged the signa-
tory yowe.rs of tne l1aris pact "to make good their declar-
ation" and to consiuer as not binding the blockade which 
the 0outh, through its eviuences, haa proven ineffect-
ual. 9 
Secondly, the commissioners again turned to the 
matter of cotton. They re,t,ortea. that the ~outh antici-
pated a favorable action by the British against the block-
ade "not only by their own declaration, but by the nature 
of the interests affeeteu by the blockade." They reminded 
riusuell "that the only certaiu and sufficient source of 
cot ton" r·eu tea in the Con1e<lt::racy. r1urthermore, the 
8.riicKett .rapers, hlspatch No. 10, Yancey, .Host and 
Mann to Hunter, .uecember 2, 1861. 
91)icKe tt I'apers, Y<:inc ey, Hust and. Mann to 1\ussell, 
Novewber 29, 1861. 
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Confederates proposed that cotton provided a livelihood 
aa much for the people who planted and raised the utuple 
ab !'or t.hoBe who t.ransported <.md. manufacturecl. it. In 
thiB :oense, then, the blockade -- ineffective though it 
may be -- still pe1sisteu as a physical impediment "to 
the general intere::;ts of man.kind, so many of whom depend 
for their means of living" on the supply of cotton. Thus, 
the Collilllissioners concluded, the illegality and ineffect-
i VEness of t11e blockaue "anu tne great interests of the 
neutral commerce 01· i;ile world" categorically demanded 
thut the British governwent "should take d€cieive action 
in Ct.ec:laring the block8.de inefft:0cti ve. 1110 
The Lauthern envoys shortly delivered a similar 
note to Thouvenal, the ¥rench Foreign Minister, in which 
t.ney explained th~ cotton fa.mine, illegal blockade, and 
public sentimentality.11 host reported that the Minister 
expresseci "astonishnient" at the list of blocka<ie evasions 
and promistd "to take the matter into serious consiaer-
a tion. nl2 Encouraged by the partial inter·est -- not 
commi truen1, -- of '.l.'houvenal and the reaction~ of the English 
lO}_)ickett }apers, Yancey, ho:::3t anu .Mann to Hussell, 
November 29, 1861. 





pre8s and populace, the corruaissioners enthusiastically 
reported u. decided. swing 01· support to the t3outhern cause. 
In inc.:.ividual letters to Hunter each com.missioner 
proceeded to elaborate on the favorable change of opin-
ion in Europe oince the Trent affair. Yet, even more 
interesting than these ordinary accounts of British and 
French public sentiment was the amount of credit which 
each minister trieu to claim for himself in the apparent 
alteration of the .European clim!;l.te of opinion. Seen in 
retrospect, this tendency on the part of the commission-
ers to offer inqividual rather than collective appraisals 
01' their efforts reflected both the late-developing fric-
tion among the commissioners and their dissatisfaction 
with the mission as a whole. To salvage some credit 
i·rom the Jtate Department for a mission which had courted 
failure since its conception, "the envoys turned to a self-
appraisal of their respbctive efforts. 
Mann enthusitiBtioally rE:ported t.tlat Confederate 
recognition "will not be much longer delayea. 11 He noted 
that Great Britain was "in downright earnestness" to seek 
amends to the humiliation suffE:reu wi tti the sei:ture of the 
1r1·ent. "Her voice, 11 commented the envoy from Virginia, 
"will now be .found in her sword." As for credit for this 
ostensible British sE:ntiment, Mann u.umitted that "by never 
losing sigbt for a moment 01 the object for which ••• (he) 
vm~. appointed," he huu succeea.ed "iu opening channels of 
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communi~ation with the most important personages of the 
realm. 11 Ht: aeclaimeu Loru :t>almerston, the .Prim~ Niniater, 
as "a noble statesman, 11 whose 11heart is as young as it was 
forty years ago." It is doubtful that Mann and :tialmerston 
ever met, but apparently this was an incidental formality 
which could hardly affect the familiarity implied by the 
sophomoric Ambrose Mann. 13 
Root, who had been appointed to lead_ the nego-
tiations in France, similarly reported that through his 
ability to perform ":tnything calculated to advance our 
cause" a favorable change of opinion had occurred in the 
Bmpero.r 's government. He noteu ·that his astioc ia ti on vii th 
mei;1bers of the l'aris Ministry "hau been more and more 
friena.ly" and that Thouvenal hau s-ce;J.ted "that no one 
coulo havt: done or accomplisheu more" t.tlan commissioner 
host. What the Southerner accom_pli:shed was scarcely sig-
nificant, yet he confidently reported that within months 
},rd.nee "would come forward anu commtlnd peace. nl4 
The. thirc. corn.missioner, William Yancey, imitated 
his a::>socia-ces in both the substance of his dispatches and 
thL self-acclaim i'or his efforts. A further- rabuttal to 
13Pickett Papers, Dis.[;atch No. 10, Mann to Hunter, 
December 24, 1861. 
14.Pickett Papers, Robt to iJctvis, December 24, 1861. 
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his biographer'b cl.aim that Yancey was a super-patriot 
manifests itself at tnis time. Throughout the mission, 
Yancey hau a.tways been the first to express discontent 
with the fruitless efforts to win recognition. Soon after 
the formal demand for recognition had failed miserably in 
August, .h.c: had intimated his desire to resign the com-
mission.15 However, with tne Trent affair, Confederate 
diplomacy, through no efforts of its own, found.itself 
temporarily in vogue again. Yancey promptly reversed his 
resignation intentions, and in a letter which e1aphacized 
his de(.!ision "to lay a~ide all private consiu.era.tions, 11 
he a!'firrued. his resolution to remain with 'the misaion. 16 
True to this pattern, though, Yancey would not hesitate 
to resign the commission a.gain when the Confederate cause 
fell from public approval -- an action hardly character-
istic of a devoted patriot! 
Attemptin_g to ha;ten the Southern demise from pop-
ul~r favor, United 6tates Secretary of State Seward and 
Union Minister Adams effectively a.rrangea a graceful re-
treat from the brink. of war with Britain over the ~:rent 
i:dsue. 1Jes.1Ji te the poyu.Lar outcrif::S to t.t1e contrary, 
neither ti'1e Uni tea States nor the B1 i tish government 
15 i::>ee Ghapter V, _vu.ge 84 ' 
16 .. l:'icke't t h1_µers, Yancey to liw1ter, November 30, 1861. 
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uebired a formal conflict with each other. Acting upon 
this retilization and in awareness, too, that the South 
had by itself proven to be a formidable opponent, Seward 
issued hit:l formal reply to Britain'~ accusations in mid-
:Uecember, 1861.17 
Seward. contended tnat although Captt:i.in Wilkes 
haa. operateu without specific instructions from the United 
~tates government, his action wa~ entirely juHtified. 18 
However, uince the Gonfeuerate commissioners -- legal con-
tru.bu.na of war though they may be -- were not taken before 
an American pri~e court for aujudication of status, they 
would immeuiately be released. 19 Though short of a formal 
apology, .the action still represented a "sacrifice of 
much national pride and self-glorification. 1120 
The British Ministry similarly accepted the Sew-
ard explanation as a substantial compliance with its 
d . 21 emunas. By the time Nason and Slidell reached London 
17 Glyna.on G. Van lJeusen, Willia1u Henry t>eward (New 
York, 1967), 31). 
18nepartment of State, niplomatic Correspondence of the 
Uni·tea t>tates, Qewaru to Acu:.:.ms, lJecember 27, 1S6I, 12-14. 
19~. 
20 4 Chandler, 11 lJiplomatic Hi~tory of Confeueracy," 45 • 
21Adams,·Britain andfil Uivil ~' II, 2)2. 
94 
at the end of January, 1862, amends had long been reached 
wi tl1 the British government. . 11he cri::>is had passed. The 
whole affair cer·tainly st~nds as a tribute to the diplo-
matic ability of Ad.ams, who, in the interlude between the 
first .tepo1·to of t1rn incident and the formal statement of 
~ea·.1rci, managed to placu.te the British Foreign Office. 
Adums' tuct and ~eward's diplomacy insured. a swift pacif-
ic settlement which consequently "prevented any special 
advantages to the Confederacy as hau been· expected from 
the . ,,22 ••• seizure. Adams, in fact, writing shortly after 
the arrival oi' Mabon and Sliae11, metaphorically compared 
the Tren! affair to a sha.rp thunderstorm, "which has 
burst without doing any harm, a.nu the consequences has 
been a decided improvement of 'the state of the atmos-
phE:re. 112:> 
Wh:Lle wheels of .Nor-r;hern diplomacy still turned 
to frustrate adverse international reaction to the Trent 
episode, Loru John ltussell replied to the Confederate 
commiusioners concerning their two prote~t notes of late 
November. On December 7, the.Foreign Secret~ry delivered 
22c11andler, "Diplomatic Hiutory of Confederacy," 454. 
. 23.,, orthing ton a. 1!1ord, Eai tor, A 9.vc le of Adams Letters, 
1861-1865 (2 vols., Boston: 1920), I, Charles Francis 
raaIDs'tOHenry Adams, l!,ebruary 21, 1862, 114. 
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to -ihe &outuern diplomats hi:.3 very cur-c ana. blunt answer 
to their demunde. He acknowledged their provioua letters, 
anci then explicitly announced. his refusal, "in the present 
state of affairs, ••• to enter into any official commun-
ication with them. 11 24 
Hussell's reply struck hard. at the core of "king 
cotton" diplomacy. Yancey, enraged by the brevity and 
terseness of the rejoinder, callea for an immediate 
counter-reply. 25 However, Rost and Mann restrained him 
from further communication vii tu iiUE:H:iell. 26 The l!'oreign 
::Jecretary • i.:, note, the last goverrnuental c orre1::1pondence 
with the commissioners, unequivocally revealed the British 
resolve to avoicl an unnecessary war with the Unitecl. 8tates 
in order to asoure a regular supply oi' cotton for its 
textile manufac.turers. The theory of "king cotton" lay 
exposed as "a delusion at the first test. 1127 
Following the letter of Russell, the ministers re-
stricted themselves to purely reportorial functions. 
Their prid.e f:3orely deflated, -chey entered into no further 
24f'ickett l'a,l.Jers, Russell to Yancey, Rost ans Mann, 
December 7, 1861. 
25pickett Payers, Yancey to Hunter, :December 31, 1861. 
26r··t· -l.Cl. 
-
27Henurick, btatesruen .2£. ~ Cause, 151. 
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communic.:ations of any importance in the weeks before the 
formal termination of their mission. Yancey admitted, 
not une.1 .. pect:J.ntly, that he wished 11 to leave here very 
much," and, upon the arrival of Mai:wn and Slidell, he 
woulci "do so at once. 11 28 
Commissioners Macon and oliuel;L finally reached 
London on ,January 29, 1862. 29· Their mission now offici-
ally diBbandea, Yancey, Rost and Hann went their separate 
ways. Mann, previously appointeu to a diplomatic position 
in Belgium, p~oceeued to that nation where he. anticipated 
to "negotiu.te ••• the first treaty ever. concluded by the 
Confederate 8tates.n30 Pierre Rost remained in the con-
genial atmosphere of Paris until the arrival of Slidell, 
and then proceeded to 8pain.3l Finally, Yancey, having 
acimitted tha"t he "hardly made up ••• (his) mind as to 
32 
what to do," returneu to the Confederacy where he assumed 
a benate seat from his home state of Alabama.33 
28~ickett ~afers, Yancey to Hunter, December 31, 1861. 
29Mason to Hunter, January 30, 1862, in Mason, ~ £! 
l"lason, 257-258. 
30pickett Papers, Mann to Davis, February 1, 1862. 
3lpickett Papers, Dispatch No. 1, Slidell to State De-
partment, .111ebruary 11, 1862. 
32Pickett Papers, Yancey to Davis, January 27, 1862. 
33Du Bose, 14££ £f. Yancey, 620. 
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~urpri~ingl.y, "to the very end, the commissioners 
still expressea a feeble optimism in the inevitability of 
recognition. In their last dispatch to Richmond, dated 
January 27, 1862, Mann and Yancey reported that although 
they could not predict the form which intervention would 
assume, they felt sure "that it will take place in a 
short time.":54 ::>uch confidence, although now fading in 
certitude, ha<i been consiste.nt in t11e commissioners• dis-
patches since the inception of the mission. However, the 
reports of an imminent re.c.:ognition -- reports which per-
meatbd the initial letters of the mission ten months 
earli~r seemeu, by this time, only hollow echoes. 
The first Confeaerate mission to Europe, a mission 
vihich hC1.a courted i'ailure and SKe,t;ticism since its in-
augEra tion, ended in futility. '1:he primary objectives 
of rec.:ognition and intervt::ntion hau not been realize<i. 
1.1he course ol' the ciout.uern diplomu.ts was largely staked 
out for them by events, c:.nd tne O!Jt:rations ·that they under-
took seem~u less guiaeu by Confeaerute initiative than by 
Union ac.:tions a.rid British reactions. Confeuerate diplo-
macy, from the start buoyed.by "king cotton" and the 
righteousness of the cause, aiscovt..red in less than a year 
that economic theory and political morality could not com-
pete with the bitter realities of international power politics. 
34Pickett Pa1Jers, Dis1;a tch No. 14, Yancey and Mann to 
Hunter, January 27, 186~. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fate of the diplomatic mission of Yancey, 
Rost and Mann was inexorably bound to the success or 
failure o:f the "king cotton" theory. When it failed to 
prostrate England and France before it in supplication, 
it removed the very foundations on which the initial 
Confederate envoys based their commission and relied 
for their arguments. The South had started the war 
with cotton as the primary entry on the positive aide 
of her secession ledger. Upon the staple crop she 
had built her society, and under the banner 11 lcing 
cotton", she dared attempt independence. Though power-
ful enough to command the respect of the leading commer-
cial nations of the world, cotton could not produce the 
sovereign status the Confederacy sought. 
"King cotton" diplomacy, from the very beginning, 
had been an enormous gamble. ~laying with this one 
principal asset, the Confederate States had sought to 
pressure Europe into recognition of her independence. 
Unfortunately for the·South, cotton was not the only 
l 
trump in this game of international political and 
economic coercion. 
The South soon recognized that Great Britain 
controlled the diplomacy of Eu.rope as pertained to the 
question of Confederate recognition. When, and if, 
England acted would determine the position of the 
major continental powers. Yet, there were too many 
factors which prevented Britain from extending more 
than a conventional acknowledgment of Confederate 
belligerency.· 
In the first place, such economic pressure as 
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the loss of cotton would ordinarily bring never developed 
to the point anticipated by the Confederacy. On account 
of an overzealous production of Southern cotton in the 
years immediately preceding secession, Gr~.at Britain 
was beset with a cotton surplus. Despite the coercive 
cotton embargo of the Confederate States, it would take 
nearly two years for this surplus to be ooneumed; and, 
by that time, a profitable cotton flow would a.gain have 
been restored between the South and Great Britain to 
supplement the wartime supplies from Egypt, Mexico, 
and India. Similarly, the English merchant class 
benefited from the war profits it was able to attain 
through sales and loans, at high prices and interest 
rates, of the manufactured products which the South 
most desparately needed. 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the 
failure of cotton was its inability to·produce a public 
outcry against the unemployment and economic hardship 
its absence purported to cause. Except for the fearful 
warnings of the few who cautioned about the impending 
famine, Yancey, Rost and Mann recordea virtually no 
grievances directed against a famine already in exist-
ence. Although the cotton famine did not reach its 
peak until the winter months of 1862-1863, even then 
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the masses in the textile centers did practically nothing 
to turn public opinion beyond the sympathy for the 
North which they manifested throughout the war. 
Governmental subsidies and private donations kept the 
potential sufferings at a minimum; but, in reality, the 
absence of a prolonged threat to their welfare kept the 
inconveniences and grumblings of the affected workers 
substantially contained. 
There were, of course, several other external 
factors which prevented a firm British move towards 
recognition and intervention. The possible vulnerability 
of England to a war with the United States which alliance 
with the Confederacy would certainly bring, and the 
fact that the majority of her people opposed slavery 
and held true to this position throughout the struggle 
added strength to the non-interventionist camp. These 
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reasons, though, important as they may be, were only 
components of the principal arguments which prevented·a 
.British commitment to the ~outh. Likewise, the effec-
tive counter-diplomacy of the Union was not sufficient 
in itself to prevent an active British position. In 
the end, the failure of cotton as a commercial induce-
ment sealed the fate of Confederate diplomacy. 
The inadequate foundation for the Southern 
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foreign policy was, of course, the root of the Confed-
erate diplomatic failure. ~trict adherence to the 
philosophy of "king cotton" precluded a flexibility of 
ac'l;ion and vitality of performance which hampered the 
Confederate diplomatic effort from the start. The 
commission's restrictive instructions, inadequate resources, 
insufficient planning, and, in particular, the unsatis-
factory selection of the diplomats themselves, all con-
tributed to suppress any initiatives which the .Confederates 
might seek. 
The argument defended by Owsley that cotton 
constituted a sensible ana pragmatic base for Con.federate 
diplomacy is misleading. '.l.'he potential coercive power 
of cotton demanded some reliance on the staple by the 
young Confederate government. Cotton, however, neither 
ordered total diplomatic dependence nor the.blind rejec-
tion of alternative approaohef:l. The secessionist 
Southerners rallied to the cause of their bogus "king" 
only to be misled by impassioned, yet exaggerated, 
arguments. The inadequate foundation of the Confeder-
ate foreign policy provided a lasting obstacle to the 
successful execution of ~outhern diplomacy. Granted, 
external 1'actors arose to hasten the collapse of 
Southern foreign policy, but the vulnerability of such 
an inadequate policy had, from the start, guaranteed 
its failure. 
With no substance to their arguments, no 
acceptance of their offers, and no reward for their 
efforts, the first envoys of the cotton kingdom met 
defeat at every turn. They found their course of action 
constantly dictated by events. They moved as the tide 
of Union actions and British reaction fluctuated. Ye't, 
" in this adverse situation, which, except for the brief 
reprieve of the Trent a!'fair, deteriorated with each 
month of the mission, the commissioners held firm to 
their idealistic confidence. 
Unfortunately, their optimism in the power of 
cotton and faith in the righteousness of the Confederate 
cause often clouded the envoys' observations of the 
true picture in h)i.rope. This lack of perspective 
was reflected in their reports to Richmond. As a 
result, dispatches claiming that recognition was 
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imminent were forthcoming from Yancey, Rost, and Mann 
with equal animation as early as May, 1861, ana as late 
as January, 1862. 
Perhaps the basic reason why the three ministers 
persisted in relating such encouraging· news to the 
Ccnfederacy. was the natu1·e of the contacts which they 
had established in London and Paris. For the most part, 
their liaisons were aristocratic gentlemen of the 
Southern lobby -- men who identified with the aristocracy 
of the tiouth and who saw in that culture one which closely 
re::>embled their own. These gentlemen viewed the Southern 
version of democracy as more in tune with the British 
view; ana th€ very fact of the potential dissolution of 
the Union fortified their belief that the h:nglish version 
was superior. 
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Throughout the mission in Great Britain and France, 
the commissioners only associat~d with men of aristocratic 
caliber. They never really became involved with the 
common people and so could never relate to the 8tate 
Department the actual solidarity of opinion of the masses 
for the Union. This inability on the part of the 
Southern envoys to effectively and completely view the 
whole European scene and analyze all opinions -- the masses 
as well as the gentlemen -- was the si.gnal failure of 
Yancey, Host and Mann as d.iplomats. 
The amateuri.sm of the commiasioners, reflected 
in their excessive optimism and poor reportorial 
ability, coupled with the inadequacies of Confederate 
foreign policy.and the pressures of other external 
factors, posed diplomatic obstacles too great to 
.overcome for the struggling Gonf~deracy~ A mission 
that began with profound expectations of imminent 
international recognition ended in subservience to 
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those impediments. The Confederates gambled that their 
policy of economic coercion anci moral certitude could 
satisfactorily a.chi eve their foreign p::>li tic al objectives. 
Europe countered with a deliberative policy based on 
intern~tional realities ana political pragmatism which 
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ment of Archives and Hiatory, 1923. 
Most of the diplomatic correspondence of the 
Crawford-Forsythe-Roman mission is in Volume V. 
United States Congress. Senate. Congressional Globe. 
43 volumes. Washington, n.C.: John C. Rives, 
1822-1865. 
United 
Volumes of particular interest were AXXVI-
1.XXIX which rec.:orded secessionist and "king cot-
ton" speeches and decl~rations of Southern sena-
tors. 
States Congress. ~enate. Journal of the Co~ss 
of the Oonfeuerate Jtat~s of America,"1:861- ti • 
rvolumes. Washington, D.C:-: GovernmentPrint-
ing Office, 1904-1<305. 
Although of no value in tracing the debates 
among the foreign policy factions in the Confed-
erate Congress,. the Journal revealed the course 
tL.at bouthern diplomacy pursued through I'eports of 
policy implementation and congrebsional resolutions 
on foreign affairs. Volume I traces the proceedings 
of the Provisional Congre~s at IWiontgomery, Alabama. 
Uniteu states Department of Navy. Official Records of 
the Union and Confeoerate Navies fu the ~ of 




Government l'rinting Office, 18':14-1927. 
~eries 2, Volume 111 of the Official Records 
contains a subst~ntiul portion of the Confederate 
diploma.tic corrE:spondence. Belection o.f material 
was selective, however, and usea for comparative 
and complementary re1'erences to the Pickett Papers. 
States Department of ::itate. Diplomatic Corres-
ponaence of the United ~tates: ~apers Relatinea 
l!,oreign Affairs, ~-1862. Washington, 15.c.: 
Government ~rinting Off ice, 1862-1863. 
to 
---
The letters and lnstructions· of Beward and 
Adams were particularly useful in tracing the oper-
ations of Union counter-diplomacy. They revealed 
the low regard for Confeaerate ministers and activ-
ities held by those two leading .figures of Northern 
diplomacy. 
?ublished .:t'ri vate t·.i.anuscripta and Contemporary Literature 
Christy, David. Cotton ~ ~: .Qr. ~lavery .!!! ~ Light 
.Q.f. Political Economy. Cincinnati: Moore, wll= 
satch, Keep and Uo., 1855. 
Christy first phra:sed the term "king cotton~' 
This work expounds the theory upon which ::>outhern 
diplomacy rested. 
Daniel, Freuerick ~., editor. The Ricrunond E:xaminer a.ur-
ing ~ ~' 2£. tne Writ'Iiigs .Qf i2!!!1 M. Danie!:-
New York: 1868. 
Daniel contributes many insights on the for-
mation of Confeuerate foreign policy anu the imple-
mentation of t!1at policy auring the war years. His 
comments on tne cotton emburgo were particularly 
interesting. 
Davia, Jefferson. The Rise and Fall of the Confea.erate 
Government.~volumeS:- ~York: Appleton, 18S1. 
'.l.'his history 01' the Confederacy by 1 ts l-1resident 
reveals many of the iaealistic notions which guided 
Davis in choosing the "cotton famine" policy. Vol-
ume II defends his diplomatic decisions. 
Du Bellet, Paul. "The Diplomacy of tne Confederate Cab-
inet." v~ashington, D. C.: Mcmuscript Di vision, 
Library of Congress, 1862. 
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Du Bellet waB a displaced Southerner who re-
siaea in ~aris throughout the war. His suggestions 
to the Confeaerate ministers on how to conduct their 
diplomacy were ill-received, which prompted him 
to write tnis critique. Although several of the 
Du Bellet papers were published for the Civil War 
Centennial commemoration in Richmond, Virginia, 
this particular paper was not. Only a limited 
number of copies of the Du Bellet article have been 
printed. 
Dumond, Dwight, euitor. ;.:iouthern Editorials on Secession. 
Gloucester, Mass.: ~eter 0mith, 1964.~ 
This work gives a representative sampling of 
the prevalent secession arguments in the years im-
mediately preceding the war. It provided a further 
understJ.nding of the widespread popularity of the 
legality of st:cession and confidence in the power 
of cotton. 
Ford, Worthington Chauncey, editor. ~Cycle of Adams 
Letters, 1861-1865. 2 volumes. Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin 00:-;-T92u. 
'1'his work contains more private correspono..ence 
of Ambassador Adams tllan official diplomatic commun-
ications. The letters were useful in revealing 
Ad.ams ' fJri va te sentiments as regards the Confeder-
ate ministers anu their aetivities. 
Mason, Virginia, editor. The ~ublic Life ~ Diplomatic 
Uorresponuence of James M. Mason with ~ome :Per-
sonal History bYh1s JJaughter. Hoanoke-;-Va.:-
0tone .Frinting and. Manufacturing Co., 1~03. 
The diplomatic correspondence in this work is 
hit~hly selective. Ma~;on't5 account of the Trent 
affair was particularly useful and informatlve. 
Hwrnell, ~:iir Vdliiam H. ~ Diary North and t>outh. 2 
volumes. New York: Harper and Bros., 186). 
Hus:.:;ell'l> work reveals much interesting mater-
ial on the initial confidE:nee of the South in a 
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cotton-based diplomacy. The records of his contacts 
with tiouthern exponents of the "king cotton" theory 
reveal the universality of opinion on the doctrine. 
i..iiuemann, B. B. and L •. Friedman, editors. ~urope Looks 
~ lli Civil ~· New York: Orion .Presa, 1960. 
Books 
This anthology of contemporary Buropean news-
paper, magazine ana. individual observations of the 
American war is more popular than reliable. 
0econdary Sources 
Adams, B. D. Great Britain and the American Civil War. 
2 volumes. New York: Longmans, Green ana c"C57;" 
l':J25. 
On a par with Owsley's work, Adams, however, 
deals specifically with Bnglish relations with both 
the Unitea ~tates anu the Confederacy. His approach 
is topical, anu generally, quite conclusive. 
Bemis, :::>amuel 1'1lagg, editor. The American ::5ecretaries 
of ota"te anu_Their lJi~IOiiiac~. lO volumes. New 
Y'Or.K: A. A. Knopf, 1927-192 • 
Henry W. Temple'o brief biography of ~eward 
in Volume VI of this series is undistinguished. 
He covers little of tne Civil War diplomacy of 
de~ara. except for the initial instructions to 
Adams and. his debatable scheme to declare war on 
.H'rance to unite the North and the t>outh in a 
common cause. 
Callahan, James .M. Diplomati.c Hibtory of lli ::>outhern 
Confeueracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins ~resa, 
ljOl. 
This work ha~ been entirely surpassed by 
Owsley'f:l .King Uotton Diplomacy with one notable 
exception. Calfahan records ui~sent within Southern 
ranks concerning the formation of Confederate for-
eign .volicy, while Owsley completely ignores evi-
dences of disagreement. 
J"Jonald, David, editor. -.r/hy the North Won ~ Civil ~· 
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Baton liouge, La.: L.t>.U. Press, 1960. 
This contuins Norman Graebner's article, 
"Northern Diplomacy and European Neut.rali ty." 
Graebner defends t.he t.hesil:3 that Southern diplomacy 
could not compete with the "politics of power" 
which characterized European foreign relations. 
Vuberman, Martin B. Charlel.:l Francis Adams, 1807-1886. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961. 
This outstanding biography of the United 
i:>tatel.:l Civil War minister to Jmgland relies heavily 
on the papers and works of Adams. 
Du :Bose, John ·~d therspoon. The Life and Times of William 
Lowndes Yance:[. Birmingham, Ala.: lwberts and 
~on, 1892. 
This account oi' Yancey's contributions to the 
Southern secession movement is overly favorable, 
yet still i::; significant for its discussion of 
Yancey's anti-"cotton famine" sentiments. Du Bose 
sheds some light on the objections raised against 
tllis policy by Rhett, Toombs and Yancey. 
henurick, Burton J. Lincoln'l.:l War Cabinet. Boston: 
Little, Brown and co.~ 1946. 
Hendrick contributes a minor, but informative, 
account of ::>ewaru's diplomacy. }'articular emphasis 
.hau been 1;laced on .D:i_uµatch No. 10, :::>eward to Adamo, 
which threatened the severance of diplomatic ties 
with England if the British government continued to 
receive the Confeuerate commissioners. 
~tatesmen or the Lost Cause. New York: 
Literary Guild Of America, 1939. 
C.i'.1a_pter V, -"A Diplomatic De but _tn .England and 
.!!'ranee, 11 treats very .l.it)l tly the initial ~>outhern 
mit:Jsion of Yancey, .itoat and Mann. 
Jordan, Donaldson and Bowin J. l:'ratt. Europe ~ ~ 
American Civil ~· New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1<)31. 
Organized in Stctions on :B1rance and Great 
Britain, emphaf=>is is on European diplomacy and 
opinion rather tnan the efforts of Union and Con.;.. 
federate diplomats. 
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Malone, Dumas, editor. ..iJictionary of American Bioe;ra~hy. 
~2 volumes. New York: ~cribner•s bons, l9?6- 4. 
The biographical sketches by Frank L. Owsley 
on f.lann ana Laura White on Robert fillett were use-
ful for background material and early bibliographic 
guidance. 
OWsley, Frank L. King Cotton Divlomacy: Foreign Helations 
of the Confea.erate f.:ltates of America. Hevised 
edition. Chlcago: Univ. oTCnicago Press, 1959. 
The standard survey of Confederate foreign 
relations, Owsley's study is massive in scope, yet 
decidedly pro-8outhern in approach. He omits much 
which would suggest divided opinions among Southern 
policy-makers concerning the most beneficial plan 
of diplomacy. The theme of the work' is cotton, 
but Owsley appears more apologetic at its failure 
than objective. Chapters I and II, "The :B,ounda-
tion of Confea.erate Diplomacy," and "The First 
.bnvoys of the Cotton Kingdom," give a chronolog-
ical survey of the development and implementation 
of ~outhern policies with the Yancey-Rost-Mann 
mission. 
J:atricK, Hembert W. Jefferson .Uavis and his Cabinet. 
Baton Rouge, La.; L.~.u. Press;-1944. 
This study contains brief discussion of dunter 
anu Toombs but emphucizes Davis' relations with 
the permanent Gabinet which was established in 
l!'e bruary, 1862. 
~tern, ..i:·hilip. ~ the Guns iwar·ed: vforld Aspect~ of 
the American Ui vil ~~ar. Gara en Ui ty, New York: 
.lJoubleaay, 1965. -
This work i~ a poor summary of European ram-
ifications of the Uivil War. 
Van Deusen, Glyndon G. l/v'illiam Henry oeward. New York: 
Oxforo Univ. rress, 1967. 
The li:i.test anu perhaps best· monograph on ~eward, 
this work deals ex tern3i vely wi tn his Civil War 
diplomacy. The autt10r offers particular insights 
to the controversy over the Declaration of ~aria. 
\~esley, Charles H. ~ Gollapse of the Confederacy. 
Viashington, lJ. G. i Associated l'ublishing Co., 
1937. 
This survey of reasons behind the eventual 
i'ailure of' the Confea.erate government emphasizes 
reliance upon cotton. 
l'eriodicals 
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Adams, H. "Why Did Not Englc..;.nd Recognize the Confederacy?" 
l1lassachusettes Historical ~ocie·ty J?roctoedings, 
LXVJ (1936-1941), 204-222. 
This brief article reviews the principal rea-
sons for no further .Britieh commitment to the South 
beyond the recognition of Confeuerate belligerency. 
The reasons li~ted. are the standard explanations. 
Baxter, James P. "Briti~h Govt;rnment and. Neutral Rights, 
1861-1865," American Historical Review, XXXIV 
(October, 1928), 12-31. 
Baxter demonstrates that the Civil War reversed 
the traditional situation of Uniteu States attemptti 
to maintain neutral rights against English encroach-
ment. 1ittle discussion of oout.hern diplomacy to 
sway the British one way or the other appears • 
.Blumenthal, Henry. "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular No-
tions and International Realities," Journal of 
Southern History, XX.XII (May, 1966), 151-171:-
'11.h.is article blastt.i Confederate diplomacy as 
too unrealiotic to compete with the actualities 
of European power politics. 
Burnett, hdmund u., editor. "Dispatch from the British 
<..:onsul at Charleston to Lora. JL.hn Hussell, 1860," 
American Historical Heview, XVIII (July, 1913), 
78)-787. 
'l'his contains much important information on 
debates in the Democratic presidential noml.nating 
convention over tr~aties to be offered by the Con-
feueracy to .huropean powers, if the failure of the 
North to grC:1.nt concessions to tne slavehola.ing states 
resulted in sece~sion. 
()handler, Walter. "Diplomatic History of the Southern 
Confederacy," Confederate Veteran, X.X.XI (Dec., 
1922), 453-458. 
A brief and datea attempt to summerize oper-
ations ana development of Southern diplomacy, it 
affords some information on the origins of the 
"cotton famine" yolicy. 
J)il.iard, Anthony w. 11 v1illiam L. Ytincey: The 8incere and 
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Unfultering Advocate of ~outhern Rights," Mont-
gomery (Alabama) Daily Aavertiser, April 15, 1893. 
Tne title of t1ds biased article speaks for 
itself. lt refle<..:tes tne influence of IJU Bose's 
interpretation of Yancey. 
ljU Bose, John Witherspoon. "Uonfederate Diplomacy," 
0outhern Hi1:1torical ~ociety iia,eers, XX.XII (1904), 
161-105. 
This offers defense of the "cotton famine" 
aoctrine. 
• 
11 \'/illiam L. Yancey in History," Richmond ____ .,,,....... 
Times, October 31, 18~9. 
Du Bose further enlarges the patriotic halo 
which he l)lanted on Yancey with his biography. 
l"ioore, J. J:>. "Lincoln ano. the Escape of the Confederate 
Commissioner A. Dudley Mann," Illinois State Hist-
orical Gociety Journal, LVII (0pring, 1964), ~ 
2)-29. 
Moore traces the route of Mann from the ~outh 
to ..tmgland and sugge~' ta that Lincoln misseu a great 
opportunity to capture the commissioner when he was 
in Washington. 
l~'ii llard, .H'lora. "~'he :B'oreign .Policy of the Confederate 
~Hates," Cunfederate Veteran, XX.VI (June, 1918), 
241-246. 
'i1hit> brief i:::t.rticle reviews the various alter-
native aiplomatic plans open to the bouth at the 
outset of ti1e war. l"iillard defends the "cotton 
famine" policy as logical and necessary. 
Rainwater, F. L. "Notes on Southern Personalities: 
A. Dudley Mann, Pierre A. Rost, William L. 
Yancey," Journal of Southern History, IV {1938), 209-227. -
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The "Notes" present very brief biographical 
aecounts of the commissioners. It is particularly 
worthwhile for the sketch on Host, who nowhere is 
mentionea in the D.A.B. 
Venable, A. L. "'•Ii lliam L. Yancey' a 'fransition from 
Unionism to '-:>t:...i.tes' Hights," Journal of .::>outhern 
Ifi~tory, X (August, 1944), )31-388. -
The article traces Y.Jncey 's career from that 
of a conservative, Unionist Congressman to se-
cessionist. 
Bibliographic Aids 
In aodition to the bibliographies which were con-
tained in the various secondary sources used, several 
standard bibliographic materials were consulted through-
out the composition of the paper. Of 1;articular note, 
were the reviews and citations of curr"ent publications 
in the various scholarly journals which were consulted. 
These included: American Historical Rbview, Civil War 
History, Foreign Affairs, Journal of American Hist~, 
Journal ol' Southern Histor;y_, .Mld-Amerlca, Missiseipl 
Valle~ HiBtorical Review, and-:ni'e Paciflc Hiatorica 
Review. Below are the standard bibliographic aids used. 
American Historical Association. Writings £!!:.American 
History. 46 volumes. Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment ~rinting Office, 1902-1903, 1906-1940, 
1948-1958. 
This series catalogues by year the various 
scholarly writings on American history. Although 
it is far frolli being up to date, it still serves 
as a valuable bibliographic maj;erial. 
Bailey, Thomas A. ~Diplomatic History 2.£ ~American 
People. 7th ed.i tion. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1964. 
Chapters 22 and 23, "The Early Crises of the 
Civil War" and "The Collapse of King Cotton Di-
plomacy," give a satisfactory general summary of 
the events and issues which highlighted Union di-
plomacy during the war period. This work was use-
ful as an early bibliographic guide. 
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Beers, Henry ?. Bibliographies_.!,!! American History. 
New York: H. w. Wilson Co., 1938. 
Bemis, 
l:hapter IV, "Diplomatic History," contains 
references to early bibliographic aids. 
Samuel Flagg and Grace c. Griffin. Guide to the 
Di~lomatic History 2f !h! United States, ~
~. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1935. 
Though over forty years behind· the times, this 
work still stands as the foremost guide to writings 
on American diplomatic history. Chapter XIII, "The 
Civil War, 1861-1865~ contains two sections on 
Union and Confederate diplomacy: "The United States 
and Europe," and "Diplomatic Efforts of the South-
ern Confederacy." 
Handlin, Oscar, et. al., editor. Harvard Guiue to Amer-
ican History:- Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap-Press; 
1954. 
Chapter 18 contains a major section on the 
Civil War and international relations. The Har-
vard Guide ranks with Bemis and Griffin's work 
ru;;-t'he criteria for American bibliographic aids. 
Nevins, Allan, et. al., euitor. Civil War Books: A 
Critical.Bihliograph~. 2 volume67 Baton Rouge, 
Lu.: 1.~.u. ~ress, 1 67. 
Volume I contains a major section entitled 
11
.Uiplomac;y," and Volume II treats on "The Confed-
eracy -- Government and :Politics." It is the most 
current bibliography on t11e Civil war period and 
it offers an excellent commentary on the works it 
cites. 
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